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T C THANGARAJ; P SUGANTHI & ANR V/S V ENGAMMAL & ORS

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA (FROM MADRAS) (D.B.)

T C THANGARAJ; P SUGANTHI & ANR V/S V ENGAMMAL & ORS

Date of Decision: 29 July 2011

Hon’ble Judges: A K Patnaik, R V Raveendran

Eq. Citations: 2011 (12) SCC 328, 2011 AIR(SC) 3010, 2011 (8) Scale 120, 2011 AIR(SCW) 4513, 2011 (5) Supreme 407, 2011 CrLJ 4348, 2011 (3) KerLT 115, 2011 (3) RCR(Cri) 751, 2011 (9) SCR 647, 2011 (3) AICLR 683, 2012 (1) SCC(Cri) 568, 2011 (3) AllCriR 3373, 2011 (108) AllIndCas 134, 2011 (4) JCR 76, 2011 (75) AllCriC 965, 2011 (3) Crimes(SC) 157, 2012 (1) LW(Cri) 120, 2012 (1) CalCriLR 353, 2011 (2) UC 1454, 2011 (50) OCR 124, 2011 (2) SCCriR 1428

Case Type: Criminal Appeal Case No: 1504 of 2011 Subject: Criminal
Head Note:

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sec 154(3), 156(3), 482 – Constitution of India – Art 226 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sec 34, 409, 420, 471 – complaint power of High Court under Article 226 of Constitution to direct investigation by CBI – High Court held that investigating agency had not done its duty properly and under circumstances, relief claimed by complainant should be granted and accordingly ordered that crime be entrusted to CBI for investigation – such power to be exercised only sparingly, cautiously and in exceptional situations and an order directing to CBI is not to be passed as a matter of routine or merely because a

party has levelled some allegations against local police – in impugned order, High Court has not exercised its constitutional powers under Article 226 of Constitution and directed CBI to investigate into complaint with a view to protect her personal liberty under Art 21 of Constitution or to enforce her fundamental right guaranteed by Part-III of Constitution – High Court has exercised its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on a grievance made by complainant that her complaint that she was cheated in a loan transaction of Rs.3 lakh by three accused persons, was not being investigated properly because one of accused persons is an Inspector of Police – it was not exceptional situations calling for exercise of extra- ordinary power of High Court to direct investigation into complaint by CBI – High Court should have directed Superintendent of Police to entrust investigation to an officer senior in rank to Inspector of Police under Sec 154(3) CrPC and not to CBI – impugned order of High Court quashed and Superintend of Police is directed to entrust investigation of Crime to a police officer senior in rank to accused – appeals allowed.

Acts Referred:

Indian Penal Code, 1860 Sec 34, Sec 420, Sec 409, Sec 471 Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Sec 482

Final Decision: Appeal allowed

Advocates: R Anand Padmanabhan, Prthvi Raj B N, Naveen, Pramod Dayal, P P Malhotra, Guru Krishna Kumar, Ranga Ramanujam, Rajiv Nanda, S Siddiqui, A K Sharma, Subramanium Prasad, Anesh Paul, Prasannv, B Krishna Prasad, S Ashok Kumar, Gouri Karuna Das Mohanti, Sanjeev Kumar Sharma, Prakhar Sharma, Rani Jethmalani, S Thananjayan

Judgement Text:-

A K Patnaik, J

[1] Delay condoned in S.L.P. (Crl.) No.1589 of 2008.

[2] Leave granted.

[3] These are two appeals against the order dated 26.10.2007 of the Madras High Court, Madurai Bench, in Criminal Original Petition No.10987 of 2007 directing that investigation into the case registered as Crime No.14 of 2006 with the District Crime Branch (DCB), Virudunagar, be entrusted to the Central Bureau of Investigation, Chennai (for short `the CBI’).

[4] The facts briefly are that on 04.08.2006 a complaint was submitted by V. Engammal, who has been impleaded as a respondent in both the appeals (hereinafter referred to as `the complainant’), to the Superintendent of Police, Virudunagar District, Tamil Nadu. The complainant made following allegations in the complaint: P. Kalaikathiravan, appellant no.2 in criminal appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1589 of 2008, who was the then S.I. of Town Police Station, told her and her husband that he was going to do the business of real estate and that they should become partners in the business but they told him that the business will not work and thereafter he asked them to give a loan of Rs.3 lakh and they handed over Rs.3 lakh to his wife P. Suganthi, appellant no.1 in criminal appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1589 of 2008. P. Kalaikathiravan then introduced T.C. Thangaraj, the appellant in criminal appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1585 of 2008, and one Nagendran who were doing real estate business. When P. Kalaikathiravan was transferred to Sethur Krishnapuram, the complainant and her husband demanded repayment of Rs.3 lakh, but P. Kalaikathiravan asked them to collect the money from T.C. Thangaraj. T.C. Thangaraj accepted the liability and gave two cheques dated 30.01.2004 and 04.02.2004 each of Rs.50,000/-, but the cheques were returned with remarks from the bank that there were no sufficient funds in the accounts. After P. Kalaikathiravan came back to Virudunagar on promotion as Inspector, her husband went to him many times and demanded money but he refused to pay the same and sent him away. In the complaint, the complainant requested the Superintendent of Police to initiate action against the Inspector, P. Kalaikathiravan, his wife P. Suganthi and T.C. Thangaraj, who had cheated the complainant and her husband. The Superintendent of Police sent the complaint to the Office In- charge of DCB, Police Station Virudunagar, on 04.08.2006 and the complaint was registered as Crime No.14 of 2006 under Sections 409, 420, 471 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short `the IPC’).

[5] When there was no progress in the investigation on the complaint, the complainant

filed Crl. O.P. No.8782 of 2006 under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short `the Cr.P.C.’) before the Madras High Court, Madurai Bench, with a prayer to entrust the case to the CBI for proper investigation. The High Court in its order dated 13.04.2007 noticed that the case is against a police officer and the grievance of the complainant was that the police department was not taking interest in pursuing the matter. The High Court, however, found that the matter was before the Judicial Magistrate and disposed of the petition giving liberty to the complainant to appear before the Judicial Magistrate concerned and file, if necessary, a protest petition if the case has been treated as a mistake of fact. The High Court further directed that the Judicial Magistrate shall consider the protest petition of the respondent keeping in mind the seriousness of the allegations made in the complaint as well as in the affidavit filed before the High Court.

[6] Thereafter, the complainant filed Crl. O.P. No.10987 of 2007 under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. before the Madras High Court, Madurai Bench, reiterating her prayer to entrust Crime No.14 of 2006 to the CBI for proper investigation. The High Court in the impugned order dated 16.10.2007 took note of the fact that the complainant had received back the sum of Rs.3 lakh in question and given a receipt dated 05.08.2006 but she had a grievance that her complaint had not been properly investigated and the investigating agency should file a final report in accordance with law. However, the High Court after perusing the entire case diary found that some witnesses have been examined but the investigation had been stopped suddenly on the ground that the complainant had received back the sum of Rs.3 lakh on 05.08.2006. The High Court held in the impugned order that even though the amount in question had been received back by the complainant, the investigating agency ought to have conducted proper investigation and filed a final report in accordance with law, but the investigating agency had failed to do it. The High Court further held that as the accused No.1 was an Inspector of Police, the investigating agency has not done its duty properly and under the circumstances, relief claimed by the complainant should be granted and accordingly ordered that Crime No.14 of 2006 be entrusted to the CBI for investigation.

[7] Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the reasons given by the High Court in the impugned order that the accused No.1 was an Inspector of Police and therefore the investigating agency has not done its duty properly, have not been held to be good reasons for entrusting the investigation to the CBI by the Constitution Bench of this Court in State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal & Ors., 2010 3 SCC 571.

[8] Learned counsel for the complainant, on the other hand, cited a decision of two- Judge Bench of this Court in Ramesh Kumari v. State (N.C.T. of Delhi) & Ors., 2006 2 SCC 677, in which this Court directed the CBI to register a case and investigate into the complaint of the appellant because the complaint was against the police officer and the Court was of the view that the interest of justice would be better served if the case is registered and investigated by an independent agency like the CBI.

[9] The decision of the two-Judge Bench of this Court in Ramesh Kumari v. State (N.C.T. of Delhi) & Ors., 2006 2 SCC 677 will have to be now read in the light of the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal & Ors., 2010 3 SCC 571. The Constitution Bench has considered at length the power of the High Court to direct investigation by the CBI into a cognizable offence alleged to have been committed within the territorial jurisdiction of a State and while taking the view that the High Court has wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution cautioned that the Courts must bear in mind certain self-imposed limitations. Para 70 of the opinion of the Constitution Bench in State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal & Ors., 2010 3 SCC 571 is extracted hereinbelow :

“Before parting with the case, we deem it necessary to emphasise that despite wide powers conferred by Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, while passing any order, the Courts must bear in mind certain self-imposed limitations on the exercise of these constitutional powers. The very plenitude of the power under the said articles requires great caution in its exercise. Insofar as the question of issuing a direction to CBI to conduct investigation in a case is concerned, although no inflexible guidelines can be laid down to decide whether or not such power should be exercised but time and again it has been reiterated that such an order is not to be passed as a matter of routine or merely because a party has levelled some allegations against the local police. This extraordinary power must be exercised sparingly, cautiously and in exceptional situations where it becomes necessary to provide credibility and instil confidence in investigations or where the incident may have national and international ramifications or where such an order may be necessary for doing complete justice and enforcing the fundamental rights. Otherwise CBI would be flooded with a large number of cases and with limited resources, may find it difficult to properly investigate even serious cases and in the process lose its credibility and purpose with

unsatisfactory investigations.”

[10] It will be clear from the opinion of the Constitution Bench quoted above that the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to direct investigation by the CBI is to be exercised only sparingly, cautiously and in exceptional situations and an order directing to CBI is not to be passed as a matter of routine or merely because a party has levelled some allegations against the local police. In the impugned order, the High Court has not exercised its constitutional powers under Article 226 of the Constitution and directed the CBI to investigate into the complaint with a view to protect her personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution or to enforce her fundamental right guaranteed by Part-III of the Constitution. The High Court has exercised its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on a grievance made by the complainant that her complaint that she was cheated in a loan transaction of Rs.3 lakh by the three accused persons, was not being investigated properly because one of the accused persons is an Inspector of Police. In our considered view, this was not one of those exceptional situations calling for exercise of extra-ordinary power of the High Court to direct investigation into the complaint by the CBI. If the High Court found that the investigation was not being completed because P. Kalaikathiravan, an Inspector of Police, was one of the accused persons, the High Court should have directed the Superintendent of Police to entrust the investigation to an officer senior in rank to the Inspector of Police under Section 154(3) Cr.P.C. and not to the CBI. It should also be noted that Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for a check by the Magistrate on the police performing their duties and where the Magistrate finds that the police have not done their duty or not investigated satisfactorily, he can direct the Police to carry out the investigation properly, and can monitor the same. (see Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. & Ors., 2008 2 SCC 409.

[11] For these reasons, we quash the impugned order of the High Court and direct that the Superintend of Police, Virudunagar District, Tamil Nadu, will entrust the investigation of Crime No. 14 of 2006 to a police officer senior in rank to P. Kalaikathiravan. The appeals are accordingly allowed.

Download Judgment below

Sakiri Vasu Vs state of UP

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA (FROM ALLAHABAD) (D.B.)

SAKIRI VASU V/S STATE OF U P

Date of Decision: 07 December 2007

Hon’ble Judges: Ashok Kumar Mathur, Markandey Katju

Eq. Citations: 2008 (2) SCC 409, 2008 AIR(SC) 907, 2007 (13) Scale 693, 2008 AIR(SCW) 309, 2007 (8) Supreme 226, 2007 (13) JT 466, 2008 (2) GLR 1666, 2008 (2) GLH 269, 2008 (3) KCCR 198, 2007 (1) RajLW 136, 2008 (1) RajLW 136, 2008 (1) KerLT 724, 2008 (1) RCR(Cri) 392, 2008 (1) RCR(Civ) 392, 2007 (12) SCR 1100, 2008 (1) AICLR 478, 2008 (1) SCC(Cri) 440, 2008 (1) AllCriR 4, 2008 CrLR 62, 2008 (1) AllLJ 752, 2008 (1) OrissaLR 105, 2008 (62) AllIndCas 236, 2008 RCrD(SC) 406, 2008 (106) CutLT 354, 2008 (3) MPWN 73, 2008 (1) MPHT 429, 2008 (60) AllCriC 689, 2008 (1) CurCriR 70, 2008 (1) JCC 113, 2007 (4) Crimes(SC) 338, 2008 (1) CriCC 1, 2008 (1) ApexCJ 324, 2007 (5) LawHerald(SC) 3910, 2008 (2) MhLJ(Cri) 300, 2008 (2) LW(Cri) 902, 2008 (1) CalCriLR 399, 2008 (1) MadLJ(Cri) 1393, 2008 (39) OCR 287, 2008 ALLSCR 1890, 2008 (1) AD(Cri) 85

Case Type: Criminal Appeal; Special Leave Petition (Crimin Case No: 1685 of 2007; 6404 of 2007
Subject: Criminal
Head Note:

(a) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 -Sections 36,154(3), 200 & 482 – Constitution of India, 1950-Art. 226-Practice and Procedure-Writ petition or petitions under Section 482-Maintainability – Exhaustion of alternative remedy -If there is an

alternative remedy, the High Court should not ordinarily interfere.

The High Court should discourage the practice of filing a writ petition or petition under Section 482 CrPC similarly because a person has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered by the police, or after being registered, proper investigation has not been done by the police. For this grievance, the remedy lies under Section 36 and 154(3) before the police officers concerned, and if that is of no avail, under Section 156(3) CrPC before the Magistrate or by filing a criminal complaint under Section 200 CrPC and not by filing a writ petition or a petition under Section 482 CrPC.

It is true that alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to writ petition, but it is equally well settled that if there is an alternative remedy the High Court should not ordinarily interfere.

(b) Constitution of India, 1950 -Arts. 32, 136 & 226 -Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946-Section 3 -CBI inquiry-Directions for-Power to order investigation by CBI-Though the Magistrate cannot order investigation by CBI but the supreme court or the High Court has power to order investigation by CBI – However, that should be done only in some rare and exceptional case.

No doubt the Magistrate cannot order investigation by CBI but this Court or the High Court has power under Article 136 or Article 226 to order investigation by CBI. That, however, should be done only in some rare and exceptional case, otherwise, CBI would be flooded with a large number of cases and would find it impossible to properly investigate all of them.

Although the High Court has power to order a CBI inquiry, that power should only be exercised if the High Court after considering the material on record comes to a conclusion that such material discloses prima facie a case calling for investigation by CBI or by any other similar agency. A CBI inquiry cannot be ordered as a matter of routine or merely because the party makes some allegation.

(c) Constitution of India, 1950 -Art. 226-CBI inquiry-Directions for -Rejection – Validity-GRP and two courts of inquiry found that it was a case of suicide – Material on record does not a disclose a prima facie case calling for an investigation by CBI -Mere allegation of appellant that his son was murdered

because he had discovered some corruption cannot justify CBI inquiry -Rejecting the prayer for a CBI inquiry-Proper.

In the present case, there was an investigation by GRP, Mathura and also two courts of inquiry held by the army authorities and they found that it was a case of suicide. Hence, in our opinion, the High Court was justified in rejecting the prayer for a CBI inquiry.

In our opinion, justify a CBI inquiry, particularly when inquiries were held by the army authorities as well as by GRP at Mathura, which revealed that it was a case of suicide.

(d) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 -Sections 154 & 156(3)- Criminal trial – Improper investigation -Remedies open to aggrieved person against-Explained.

If a person has a grievance that the police station is not registering his FIR under Section 154 CRPC, then he can approach the Superintendent of Police under Section 154(3) CRPC by an application in writing. Even if that does not yield any satisfactory result in the sense that either the FiR is still not registered, or that even after registering it no proper investigation is held, it is open to the aggrieved person to file an application under Section 156(3) CRPC before the learned Magistrate concerned, In such an application under Section 156(3) is filed before the Magistrate, the Magistrate can direct the FIR to be registered and also can direct a proper investigation to be made, in a case where, according to the aggrieved person, no proper investigation was, made. The Magistrate can also under the same provision monitor the investigation to ensure a proper investigation.

Even of an FIR has been registered and even if the police has made the investigation, or is actually making the investigation, which the aggrieved person feels is not proper, such a person an approach the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC, and if the Magistrate is satisfied he can order a proper investigation and take other suitable steps and pass such order (s) as he thinks necessary for ensuring a proper investigation. All these powers a Magistrate enjoys under Section 156(3) CrPC.

Section 156(3) provides for a check by the Magistrate on the police performing its duties under Chapter XII CrPC. In cases where the Magistrate finds that the police

has not done its duty of investigation the case at all, or has not done it satisfactorily, he can issue a direction to the police to do the investigation properly, and can monitor the same.

Section 156(3) CrPC is wide enough to include all such powers in a Magistrate which are necessary for ensuring proper investigation and it includes the power to order registration of an FIR and of ordering a proper investigation if the Magistrate is satisfied that a proper investigation has not been done, or is not being done by the police. Section 156(3) CrPC, hough briefly worded, in our opinion, is very wide and it will include all such incidental powers as are necessary for ensuring a proper investigation.- Appeal Dismissed

Acts Referred:

Constitution Of India Art 136, Art 226, Art 32
Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Sec 156(3), Sec 482, Sec 154(3), Sec 200, Sec 125, Sec 36, Sec 154
Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 Sec 3

Final Decision: Appeal dismissed Advocates: Dinesh Kumar Garg

Reference Cases: Cases Cited in (+): 651 Cases Referred in (+): 15

Judgement Text:-

Markandeya Katju, J [1] Leave granted.

[2] This appeal is directed against the impugned judgment and order dated 13.7.2007 passed by the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 9308 of 2007.

[3] Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

[4] The son of the appellant was a Major in the Indian Army. His dead body was found on 23.8.2003 at Mathura Railway Station. The G.R.P, Mathura investigated the matter and gave a detailed report on 29.8.2003 stating that the death was due to an accident or suicide.

[5] The Army officials at Mathura also held two Courts of Inquiry and both times submitted the report that the deceased Major S. Ravishankar had committed suicide at the railway track at Mathura junction. The Court of Inquiry relied on the statement of the Sahayak (domestic servant) Pradeep Kumar who made a statement that “deceased Major Ravishankar never looked cheerful; he used to sit on a chair in the verandah gazing at the roof with blank eyes and deeply involved in some thoughts and used to remain oblivious of the surroundings”. The Court of Inquiry also relied on the deposition of the main eye-witness, gangman Roop Singh, who stated that Major Ravishankar was hit by a goods train that came from Delhi.

[6] The appellant who is the father of Major Ravishankar alleged that in fact it was a case of murder and not suicide. He alleged that in the Mathura unit of the Army there was rampant corruption about which Major Ravishankar came to know and he made oral complaints about it to his superiors and also to his father. According to the appellant, it was for this reason that his son was murdered.

[7] The first Court of Inquiry was held by the Army which gave its report in September, 2003 stating that it was a case of suicide. The appellant was not satisfied with the findings of this Court of Inquiry and hence on 22.4.2004 he made a representation to the then Chief of the Army Staff, General N.C. Vij, as a result of which another Court of Inquiry was held. However, the second Court of Inquiry came to the same conclusion as that of the first inquiry namely, that it was a case of suicide.

[8] Aggrieved, a writ petition was filed in the High Court which was dismissed by the impugned judgment. Hence this appeal.

[9] The petitioner (appellant herein) prayed in the writ petition that the matter be ordered to be investigated by the Central Bureau of Investigation (in short “CBI”). Since his prayer was rejected by the High Court, hence this appeal by way of special leave.

[10] It has been held by this Court in CBI & another vs. Rajesh Gandhi and another 1997 Cr.L.J 63 (vide para 8) that no one can insist that an offence be investigated by a particular agency. We fully agree with the view in the aforesaid decision. An aggrieved

person can only claim that the offence he alleges be investigated properly, but he has no right to claim that it be investigated by any particular agency of his choice.

[11] In this connection we would like to state that if a person has a grievance that the police station is not registering his FIR under Section 154 Cr.P.C., then he can approach the Superintendent of Police under Section 154(3) Cr.P.C. by an application in writing. Even if that does not yield any satisfactory result in the sense that either the FIR is still not registered, or that even after registering it no proper investigation is held, it is open to the aggrieved person to file an application under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. before the learned Magistrate concerned. If such an application under Section 156 (3) is filed before the Magistrate, the Magistrate can direct the FIR to be registered and also can direct a proper investigation to be made, in a case where, according to the aggrieved person, no proper investigation was made. The Magistrate can also under the same provision monitor the investigation to ensure a proper investigation.

[12] Thus in Mohd. Yousuf vs. Smt. Afaq Jahan & Anr. JT 2006(1) SC 10, this Court observed:

“The clear position therefore is that any judicial Magistrate, before taking cognizance of the offence, can order investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. If he does so, he is not to examine the complainant on oath because he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein. For the purpose of enabling the police to start investigation it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police to register an FIR. There is nothing illegal in doing so. After all registration of an FIR involves only the process of entering the substance of the information relating to the commission of the cognizable offence in a book kept by the officer in charge of the police station as indicated in Section 154 of the Code. Even if a Magistrate does not say in so many words while directing investigating under Section 156(3) of the Code that an FIR should be registered, it is the duty of the officer in charge of the police station to register the FIR regarding the cognizable offence disclosed by the complaint because that police officer could take further steps contemplated in Chapter XII of the Code only thereafter.”

[13] The same view was taken by this Court in Dilawar Singh vs. State of Delhi JT 2007 (10) SC 585 (vide para 17). We would further clarify that even if an FIR has been registered and even if the police has made the investigation, or is actually making the

investigation, which the aggrieved person feels is not proper, such a person can approach the Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., and if the Magistrate is satisfied he can order a proper investigation and take other suitable steps and pass such order orders as he thinks necessary for ensuring a proper investigation. All these powers a Magistrate enjoys under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.

[14] Section 156 (3) states:
“Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an

investigation as abovementioned.”

The words `as abovementioned” obviously refer to Section 156 (1), which contemplates investigation by the officer in charge of the Police Station.

[15] Section 156(3) provides for a check by the Magistrate on the police performing its duties under Chapter XII Cr.P.C. In cases where the Magistrate finds that the police has not done its duty of investigating the case at all, or has not done it satisfactorily, he can issue a direction to the police to do the investigation properly, and can monitor the same.

[16] The power in the Magistrate to order further investigation under Section 156(3) is an independent power, and does not affect the power of the investigating officer to further investigate the case even after submission of his report vide Section 173(8). Hence the Magistrate can order re-opening of the investigation even after the police submits the final report, vide State of Bihar vs. A.C. Saldanna AIR 1980 SC 326 (para 19).

[17] In our opinion Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include all such powers in a Magistrate which are necessary for ensuring a proper investigation, and it includes the power to order registration of an F.I.R. and of ordering a proper investigation if the Magistrate is satisfied that a proper investigation has not been done, or is not being done by the police. Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., though briefly worded, in our opinion, is very wide and it will include all such incidental powers as are necessary for ensuring a proper investigation.

[18] It is well-settled that when a power is given to an authority to do something it includes such incidental or implied powers which would ensure the proper doing of that

thing. In other words, when any power is expressly granted by the statute, there is impliedly included in the grant, even without special mention, every power and every control the denial of which would render the grant itself ineffective. Thus where an Act confers jurisdiction it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts or employ such means as are essentially necessary to its execution.

[19] The reason for the rule (doctrine of implied power) is quite apparent. Many matters of minor details are omitted from legislation. As Crawford observes in his “Statutory Construction” (3rd edn. page 267):-

“If these details could not be inserted by implication, the drafting of legislation would be an indeterminable process and the legislative intent would likely be defeated by a most insignificant omission”.

[20] In ascertaining a necessary implication, the Court simply determines the legislative will and makes it effective. What is necessarily implied is as much part of the statute as if it were specifically written therein.

[21] An express grant of statutory powers carries with it by necessary implication the authority to use all reasonable means to make such grant effective. Thus in ITO, Cannanore vs. M.K. Mohammad Kunhi, AIR 1969 SC 430, this Court held that the income tax appellate tribunal has implied powers to grant stay, although no such power has been expressly granted to it by the Income Tax Act.

[22] Similar examples where this Court has affirmed the doctrine of implied powers are Union of India vs. Paras Laminates AIR 1991 SC 696, Reserve Bank of India vs. Peerless General Finance and Investment Company Ltd AIR 1996 SC 646 (at p. 656), Chief Executive Officer & Vice Chairman Gujarat Maritime Board vs. Haji Daud Haji Harun Abu 1996 (11) SCC 23, J. K. Synthetics Ltd. vs. Collector of Central Excise, AIR 1996 SC 3527, State of Karnataka vs. Vishwabharati House Building Co-op Society 2003 (2) SCC 412 (at p. 432) etc.

[23] In Savitri vs. Govind Singh Rawat AIR 1986 SC 984 this Court held that the power conferred on the Magistrate under Section 125Cr.P.C. to grant maintenance to the wife implies the power to grant interim maintenance during the pendency of the proceeding, otherwise she may starve during this period.

[24] In view of the abovementioned legal position, we are of the view that although

Section 156(3) is verybriefly worded, there is an implied power in the Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. to order registration of a criminal offence and /or to direct the officer in charge of the concerned police station to hold a proper investigation and take all such necessary steps that may be necessary for ensuring a proper investigation including monitoring the same. Even though these powers have not been expressly mentioned in Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., we are of the opinion that they are implied in the above provision.

[25] We have elaborated on the above matter because we often find that when someone has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered at the police station and/or a proper investigation is not being done by the police, he rushes to the High Court to file a writ petition or a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. We are of the opinion that the High Court should not encourage this practice and should ordinarily refuse to interfere in such matters, and relegate the petitioner to his alternating remedy, firstly under Section 154(3) and Section 36 Cr.P.C. before the concerned police officers, and if that is of no avail, by approaching the concerned Magistrate under Section 156(3).

[26] If a person has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered by the police station his first remedy is to approach the Superintendent of Police under Section 154(3) Cr.P.C. or other police officer referred to in Section 36 Cr.P.C. If despite approaching the Superintendent of Police or the officer referred to in Section 36 his grievance still persists, then he can approach a Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. instead of rushing to the High Court by way of a writ petition or a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Moreover he has a further remedy of filing a criminal complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C. Why then should writ petitions or Section 482 petitions be entertained when there are so many alternative remedies?

[27] As we have already observed above, the Magistrate has very wide powers to direct registration of an FIR and to ensure a proper investigation, and for this purpose he can monitor the investigation to ensure that the investigation is done properly (though he cannot investigate himself). The High Court should discourage the practice of filing a writ petition or petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. simply because a person has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered by the police, or after being registered, proper investigation has not been done by the police. For this grievance, the remedy lies under Sections 36 and 154(3) before the concerned police officers, and if that is of no avail, under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate or by filing a criminal complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and not by filing a writ petition or a petition under

Section 482 Cr.P.C.

[28] It is true that alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to a writ petition, but it is equally well settled that if there is an alternative remedy the High Court should not ordinarily interfere.

[29] In Union of India vs. Prakash P. Hinduja and another 2003 (6) SCC 195 (vide para 13), it has been observed by this Court that a Magistrate cannot interfere with the investigation by the police. However, in our opinion, the ratio of this decision would only apply when a proper investigation is being done by the police. If the Magistrate on an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is satisfied that proper investigation has not been done, or is not being done by the officer-in-charge of the concerned police station, he can certainly direct the officer in charge of the police station to make a proper investigation and can further monitor the same (though he should not himself investigate).

[30] It may be further mentioned that in view of Section 36 Cr.P.C. if a person is aggrieved that a proper investigation has not been made by the officer-in-charge of the concerned police station, such aggrieved person can approach the Superintendent of Police or other police officer superior in rank to the officer-in-charge of the police station and such superior officer can, if he so wishes, do the investigation vide CBI vs. State of Rajasthan and another 2001 (3) SCC 333 (vide para 11), R. P. Kapur vs. S.P. Singh AIR 1961 SC 1117 etc. Also, the State Government is competent to direct the Inspector General, Vigilance to take over the investigation of a cognizable offence registered at a police station vide State of Bihar vs. A.C. Saldanna (supra).

[31] No doubt the Magistrate cannot order investigation by the CBI vide CBI vs. State of Rajasthan and another (Supra), but this Court or the High Court has power under Article 136 or Article 226 to order investigation by the CBI. That, however should be done only in some rare and exceptional case, otherwise, the CBI would be flooded with a large number of cases and would find it impossible to properly investigate all of them.

[32] In the present case, there was an investigation by the G.R.P., Mathura and also two Courts of Inquiry held by the Army authorities and they found that it was a case of suicide. Hence, in our opinion, the High Court was justified in rejecting the prayer for a CBI inquiry.

[33] In Secretary, Minor Irrigation & Rural Engineering Services U.P. and others vs.

Sahngoo Ram Arya and another 2002 (5) SCC 521 (vide para 6) , this Court observed that although the High Court has power to order a CBI inquiry, that power should only be exercised if the High Court after considering the material on record comes to a conclusion that such material discloses prima facie a case calling for investigation by the CBI or by any other similar agency. A CBI inquiry cannot be ordered as a matter of routine or merely because the party makes some allegation.

[34] In the present case, we are of the opinion that the material on record does not disclose a prima facie case calling for an investigation by the CBI. The mere allegation of the appellant that his son was murdered because he had discovered some corruption cannot, in our opinion, justify a CBI inquiry, particularly when inquiries were held by the Army authorities as well as by the G.R.P. at Mathura, which revealed that it was a case of suicide.

[35] It has been stated in the impugned order of the High Court that the G.R.P. at Mathura had investigated the matter and gave a detailed report on 29.8.2003. It is not clear whether this report was accepted by the Magistrate or not. If the report has been accepted by the Magistrate and no appeal/revision was filed against the order of the learned Magistrate accepting the police report, then that is the end of the matter. However, if the Magistrate has not yet passed any order on the police report, he may do so in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above.

[36] With the above observations, this appeal stands dismissed.

[37] Let a copy of this judgment be sent by the Secretary General of this Court to the Registrar Generals/Registrars of all the High Courts, who shall circulate a copy of this Judgment to all the Hon”ble Judges of the High Courts.

Supreme Court Extended Limitation period to 01.03.2022

In March, 2020, Supreme Court of India took Suo Motu cognizance of the difficulties that might be faced by the litigants in filing petitions/ applications/ suits/ appeals/ all other quasi proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed under the general law of limitation or under any special laws (both Central and/or State) due to the outbreak of the COVID­19 pandemic.
On 23.03.2020, Supreme Court of India directed extension of the period of limitation in all proceedings before Courts/Tribunals including Supreme Court of India w.e.f. 15.03.2020 till further orders. On 08.03.2021, the order dated 23.03.2020 was brought to an end, permitting the relaxation of period of limitation between 15.03.2020 and 14.03.2021. While doing so, it was made clear that the period of limitation would start from 15.03.2021.
Thereafter, due to a second surge in COVID­19 cases, the Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association (SCAORA) intervened in the Suo Motu proceedings by filing Miscellaneous Application No. 665 of 2021 seeking restoration of the order dated 23.03.2020 relaxing limitation. The aforesaid Miscellaneous Application No.665 of 2021 was disposed of by Supreme Court of India vide Order dated 23.09.2021, wherein Supreme Court of India extended the period of limitation in all proceedings before the Courts/Tribunals including Supreme Court of India w.e.f 15.03.2020 till 02.10.2021.
Taking into consideration the impact of the surge of the virus on public health and adversities faced by litigants in the prevailing conditions, it has been directed by the supreme court that the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall stand excluded for the purposes of limitation as may be prescribed under any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasi­ judicial proceedings. Consequently, the balance period of limitation remaining as on 03.10.2021, if any, shall become available with effect from 01.03.2022.
In cases where the limitation would have expired during the period between 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022, notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 01.03.2022. In the event the actual balance period of limitation remaining, with effect from 01.03.2022 is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply.
It is further clarified by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall also stand excluded in computing the periods prescribed under Sections 23 (4) and 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and provisos (b) and (c) of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and any other laws, which prescribe period(s) of limitation for instituting proceedings, outer limits (within which the court or tribunal can condone delay) and termination of proceedings.

Anticipatory Bail granted By Delhi High court in 376/509/506 IPC case

The Hon’ble High court of delhi has granted anticipatory bail in 376 IPC matter wherein allegation of rape has been leveled against the accused.

The case is based upon a complaint filed by a daughter against her step father which resulted in to an FIR under section 376/509/506 IPC. During the investigation the NBWs have also been issued against the accused.

The Hon’ble High court of Delhi based on the obersations of the Hon’ble Supreme court in Siddharam Sthlingappa Mhetre case has held that even though the allegations against the applicant are serious in nature but the severity of the allegations is not the only consideration which should result in denial of grant of bail to the petitioner. The totality of the circumstances deserves to be seen before a person is granted or denied anticipatory bail.

The Hon’ble High court has further held that In the instant case, the petitioner has been able to make out a case for grant of anticipatory bail on account of the fact that no recovery of any articles is to be effected inasmuch as this is a case where all the articles have been seized by the police as per the Status Report and he had joined the investigation at least six times.

There are two more considerations which are being taken into account for grant of anticipatory bail. Firstly, the petitioner is having roots in the society and no apprehension has been shown by the prosecution that there is a chance of fleeing away of the petitioner from the process of law.

The accused has been granted anticipatory bail on his furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the IO/SHO concerned with the condition that he shall not tamper with the evidence or threaten any of the witnesses.

READ COMPLETE ORDER BELOW:

HIGH COURT OF DELHI

AMEET KHANDELWAL V/S STATE OF NCT OF DELHI

Date of Decision: 23 April 2021

Hon’ble Judges: Rajnish Bhatnagar Case Type: Bail Application
Case No: 1162 of 2021
Subject: Criminal

Acts Referred:

INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 SEC 376, SEC 509, SEC 506 CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 SEC 438, SEC 164 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT, 1881 SEC 138

Judgement Text:-

Rajnish Bhatnagar, J

[1] The present bail application has been filed under Section 438 Cr.P.C. on behalf of the petitioner for grant of anticipatory bail in case FIR No. 005/2021 under Sections 376/506/509 IPC registered at Police Station Greater Kailash as the Court of Sessions dismissed his anticipatory bail application on 01.04.2021, holding that the allegations against the petitioner are serious and it is not a fit case for grant of anticipatory bail.

[2] Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that on 29.12.2020 a complaint was lodged by the victim at P.S. Greater Kailash against the petitioner who is her step father. In the said complaint, the complainant stated that she was pursuing Economics from D.U. and was staying with her mother after the separation of her mother from her father in the year 2001. It is stated that her mother is a business woman and in the year 2010 her mother met the petitioner who was also divorcee, and they married each other in the year 2012. Thereafter the petitioner also started living with them and started working in the complainant’s mother company. It is alleged that shortly, after the marriage between the petitioner and mother of the complainant, behaviour of the petitioner from the beginning was over friendly with her and was always finding excuses to physically touch her and hug her.

[3] It is further alleged that the complainant objected to the behaviour of the petitioner who told her that he was only trying to teach her and discipline her and she could not take it otherwise. It is further alleged that soon his behaviour progressed in the direction of aggressive sexual harassment and was always trying to touch the body of the complainant when no one was looking. It is alleged that the complainant was severely, emotionally depressed and then she started to object very loudly telling the petitioner not to touch her on her bum or any other part of her body even as a friendly gesture.

[4] It is further alleged that after observing this kind of behaviour for a long time, the complainant started avoiding the petitioner whom she always addressed as daddy. It is further alleged that the behaviour of the petitioner was very vulgar and cheap in front of the complainant and he had no respect for her mother. It is further alleged that the life style of the petitioner is like a street goon and he always dresses inappropriately and used to roam around inside the house and in front of the complainant wearing only shorts and with bare chest. It is further alleged that the complainant always used to suspect that he is trying to mix some medicines in her drink such as tea, coffee, juice as on several occasions, she noticed that the taste of the drinks were strange. It is alleged that once after consuming such drink, the complainant felt dizzy and felt like she was going unconscious so she immediately took a bath with cold water to keep herself

awake. It is further alleged that thereafter the complainant avoided having tea, coffee, juice etc. whenever the petitioner was near her or near the kitchen.

[5] It is further alleged that she has not shared this with her mother. One day her mother had a cup of green tea made by the petitioner for the complainant which she did not drink, but her mother consumed this green tea, and she became unconscious and woke up next morning with a severe headache and other symptoms. It is further alleged that after this incident the complainant completely stopped drinking and eating near the petitioner. It is further alleged that every time the petitioner went on international trips, he always wanted to go or come via Bangkok where he would often stay at night to satisfy his lusts. It is alleged that the petitioner used to bring his goon type friends to the house to drink and then they would cheaply speak in the house.

[6] It is alleged that on 18.05.2020 around 09-09:30 a.m. when the complainant was taking bath in her bathroom, she forgot to take her towel inside. It is alleged that after she finished bathing, she shouted out loud to the maid to hand her towel. It is alleged that there was a knock on the door which the complainant thought was maid but to her shock it was the petitioner at the door and he pushed opened the door and grabbed her and licked the face of the complainant. It is further alleged that the petitioner inserted his finger inside her private part and refused to leave her. When the complainant struggled and shouted the petitioner pushed her and punched her in her stomach and asked her to keep quiet. It is alleged that thereafter he took out his mobile and told that he was making nude video of the complainant and if she would make noise then he would show this video on the internet. It is alleged that the petitioner also threatened her to kill the complainant and her mother. It is alleged that thereafter the petitioner left the house and ran away. It is alleged that when she discussed and shared the incident with her mother, she broke down and assured the complainant not to worry and that she would support her and would not keep quiet about this incident, even if the complainant published the nude pictures of the complainant.

[7] I have heard Mr. Sudhir Nandrajog, Sr. Adv., counsel for the petitioner as well as Ld. APP for the State. The private counsel representing the complainant had also made her submissions and assisted the Ld. APP.

[8] The main contention of the Ld. Sr. Counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner has been falsely implicated in the instant case. It is submitted that the marriage between the mother of the complainant and the petitioner is their second marriage and they had incorporated a company namely “Prayer Dhoop Agarbatti Pvt. Ltd.” of which they are the owners of 50% share holding as well as directors in the company. It is further submitted that Mrs. Pooja Goela was caught cheating by the petitioner as the photographs of Ms. Pooja Goela with another person were revealed to the petitioner and the differences arose due to the infidelity of Mrs. Pooja Goela and for this reason the petitioner left the property where he was living with her family and started living with his friend at Laxmi Nagar from January 2020 till march 2020.

[9] It is submitted that the memorandum of settlement on 05.03.2020 was entered into between the petitioner and Mrs. Pooja Goela which noted the differences between the petitioner and Mrs. Pooja Goela and they agreed to live separately for six months and it was also agreed that separate payments with respect to accommodation for the petitioner shall be paid by the company. It is further urged that the petitioner also arranged for an alternate accommodation in the name of the company in East of Kailash and a lease deed dated 06.03.2020 was executed and the possession was handed over to the petitioner. He further submitted that Mrs. Pooja Goela started misappropriating the funds of the company and started new company namely “Prayer Ensemble Pvt. Ltd.” in which she had share holding of 80% and the same was created with the sole purpose to cause monetary loss to the petitioner. It is submitted that since Mrs. Pooja Goela was indiscriminately withdrawing the money from the account of the company, the petitioner preferred letters to the banker of the company i.e. ICICI Bank to freeze the account of the company, so, acting on the complaint of the petitioner ICICI Bank imposed debit freeze on the account of the company.

[10] It is further submitted that Mrs. Pooja Goela preferred a company petition and vide order dated 10.11.2020, conditional release was granted for limited purpose. It is further urged by the Ld. Sr. cousnel that Mrs. Pooja Goela in collusion with ICICI Bank indiscriminately withdrew money in gross violation of the orders of NCLT so that the petitioner was compelled to initiate contempt proceedings against Mrs. Pooja Goela and ICICI bank. It is further submitted that the cheques issued to the petitioner by the company were dis-honoured by the bankers of the petitioner as Ms. Pooja Goela had stopped the cheques, so complaints U/s 138 NI Act have been preferred by the petitioner against the company and Mrs. Pooja Goela. It is further submitted by the Ld. Sr. counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was regularly threatened implications in false cases about which he made complaints at P.S. Greater Kailash at different point of time. It is further submitted that there is a delay of more than 7 months in filing the present complaint by the complainant and there is no explanation for the delay. It is further submitted that the alleged incident is dated 18.05.2020 but the complainant preferred the complaint on 29.12.2020 which has been filed solely with the purpose that the petitioner may not pursue his business interest in the company.

[11] It is further urged that the petitioner was not residing at the residence R-64, 3rd Floor, Greater Kailalsh-1, where the complainant was present on the date of the incident and the IO made no efforts to obtain the location of the petitioner’s mobile phone. It is further submitted that the petitioner had never absconded and has joined investigation on 10.02.2021, 11.02.2021, 12.02.2021, 15.02,2021, 16.02,2021 and 17.02.2021. It is further submitted that the allegations in the FIR are totally false and no dates, day, time has been mentioned about the incidents. It is further submitted that no custodial interrogation is required and the petitioner has clean past antecedents. It is further submitted by the Ld. Sr. counsel that the contents of the FIR are highly improbable and cannot be believed. It is further submitted that according to the complainant, the petitioner prior to the alleged incident of 18.05.2020 has been misbehaving and sexually harassing the complainant but she had never made any complaint to her mother or brother which shows that she had no complaints.

[12] It is further submitted that as per the complainant once the mother of the complainant fell un-conscious after drinking green tea which was meant for the complainant but the mother of the complainant drank the same, still the complainant failed to bring to the notice of her mother the alleged conduct of sexual harassment to the notice of her mother. It is further submitted by the Ld. Sr. counsel that the complainant even had a grown up brother and she never brought even to his notice the alleged misconduct/sexual harassment being done by the petitioner. It is further submitted that the FIR has been filed after 7 months of the alleged incident under a well planned strategy to extort money from the petitioner and to take revenge from the petitioner for the cases filed by him for redressal of bonafide grievances as the owner of the company. It is further submitted by the Ld. Sr. counsel that the mother of the complainant was pursuing all sorts of litigations against the petitioner prior to the date of complaint which is 29-12-2020 and had any such incident taken place, there was no reason for the complainant or her mother to keep quiet and it also cannot be said that they were not conversant with the law or had no brush with the court cases.

[13] On the other hand, it is submitted by the Ld. APP that the allegations against the petitioner are grave and serious in nature. The petitioner is step father of the complainant and if the daughter is not safe with one’s father, then she has no place to go. It is further submitted by the Ld. APP that the location of the petitioner as per the ID chart of mobile phone was found at the place of occurrence. It is further submitted that the complainant’s statement U/s 164 Cr.P.C has been recorded wherein she has reiterated the version given in the FIR. It is submitted by the counsel for the complainant that the accused/petitioner may not be available for the trial as he has mentioned different addresses in the bail petition and there are chances that he may flee from the justice. It is further submitted that there is an independent witness who is the maid working at the time of the incident in the house of the complainant. As regard the delay in lodging the FIR, it is submitted that the complainant remained silent to save the matrimonial trauma of her mother and the marriage of the complainant was fixed during that period and if the fiance of the complainant would have come to know about the incident, he would have broken the relationship.

[14] No doubt, the allegations against the petitioner are serious in nature but the severity of the allegations is not the only consideration which should result in denial of grant of bail to the petitioner. The totality of the circumstances deserves to be seen before a person is granted or denied anticipatory bail. The Supreme Court in case titled Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2011 1 SCC 694 has laid down that the Court should be loath to reject the grant of anticipatory bail in as much as it impinges on the personal liberty of a person. Meaning thereby, unless and until there is an imminent and a great imperative to have a custodial interrogation of an accused, the anticipatory bail does not deserve to be denied.

[15] In the instant case, there is no denial to the fact that the petitioner and his wife who is the mother of the complainant are involved in various litigations amongst each other. The mobile phone has already been recovered and the petitioner has already joined the investigation on 10.02.2021, 11.02.2021, 12.02.2021, 15.02,2021, 16.02,2021 and 17.02.2021. As per the status report, filed by the state in compliance of the order dated 09.02.2021 of Sh. Gaurav Rao, Ld. ASJ, Saket Court, New Delhi, the verification of the complaints given by the petitioner has also been done and it has been found that the applicant/petitioner has filed 3 complaints at P.S. Greater Kailash, wherein he has mentioned about his apprehension of being arrayed in a false case of molestation by his step daughter on the instructions of his wife. As per the status report, all the information with regard to the mobile phones being used by the petitioner has been supplied to the police.

[16] As already observed hereinabove, the petitioner has joined the investigation on numerous occasions. There is a history of litigations in regard to the control of business between the petitioner and the mother of the complainant. Ld. Sr. counsel for the petitioner has also laid much emphasis on the delay in lodging the FIR and contended that there is no plausible explanation for the delay and the same is fatal to the case of the complainant. In the instant case, the alleged offence took place on 18.05.2020 and on the same very day, according to the complainant she had informed her mother about the incident and also discussed with her but the complaint was only lodged on 29.12.2020. In between this period from the record, it is evident that the petitioner and the mother of the complainant have been litigating.

[17] No doubt, the delay in lodging the FIR is not always fatal and it depends upon the facts of each case. The reasons given by the counsel for the complainant for the delay is that the complainant never wanted to spoil the matrimonial home of her mother and secondly her fiance would have left her if he had come to know about the conduct of the petitioner. Though, the complainant has tried to explain the delay, but the same can be looked into at the time of trial and as to what would be the fate of such delay would be seen at that particular stage.

[18] The perusal of the FIR shows that no day, date, month and time has been given by the petitioner with regard to the incident prior to 18.05.2020. It is also not understood as to why she had not even once made any complaint to her mother and brother about the misconduct and sexual harassment being meted out by the petitioner and when at one stage according to the complainant, her mother even fell unconscious after drinking green tea which the petitioner brought for the complainant but was drank by the mother of the complainant but then also the complainant failed to tell her mother and brother about the conduct of the petitioner as already observed.

[19] In the instant case, the petitioner has been able to make out a case for grant of anticipatory bail on account of the fact that no recovery of any articles is to be effected inasmuch as this is a case where all the articles have been seized by the police as per the Status Report and he had joined the investigation at least six times.

[20] There are two more considerations which are being taken into account for grant of anticipatory bail. Firstly, the petitioner is having roots in the society and no apprehension has been shown by the prosecution that there is a chance of fleeing away of the petitioner from the process of law.

[21] In so far as the contention of the petitioner tampering with the evidence or threatening the witnesses are concerned a generalize statement has been made by the counsel for the complainant and nothing has been shown to the Court in the form of any cogent and prim-facie evidence which could show that he has threatened anybody or tried to tamper with the evidence.

[22] It has also been argued by the Ld. APP that NBWs were obtained against the petitioner as he has not been joining the investigation but thereafter as per the status report, the petitioner has joined the investigation. Merely because the NBWs were issued against the petitioner cannot be a sufficient ground for denying the grant of anticipatory bail, if it is otherwise made out. Every reasonable person who has approached the Court for grant of anticipatory bail will keep away from the investigation for some time so that his bail application may not become infructuous.

[23] Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, I am inclined to admit the petitioner to anticipatory bail on his furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the IO/SHO concerned with the condition that he shall not tamper with the evidence or threaten any of the witnesses. The bail application is disposed of accordingly.

[24] Nothing stated hereinabove shall tantamount to the expression of any opinion on the merits of this case.

Bail granted in serious fraud investigation matter

The Hon’ble High court of Delhi granted regular bail in SFIO(serious fraud investigation) matter

READ ORDER BELOW

HIGH COURT OF DELHI
ADITYA KUMAR BHANDARI V/S SERIOUS FRAUD INVESTIGATION OFFICE

Hon’ble Judges: Suresh Kumar Kait Case Type: Bail Application IN Case No: 639 of 2020

Judgement Text:-
Suresh Kumar Kait, J
[1] The present petition is filed seeking the indulgence of this Court for enlargement of the petitioner on bail in Reg. No.CC/149/2020.
[2] The case of petitioner is that RHL was established on 04.08.2004. The eldest brother of Srivastava Family namely, Late Rajesh Srivastava was the ‘Founder Chairman and Managing Director’ of Rockland Hospitals Limited (hereinafter referred to as “RHL’) and was solely managing the day-to-day affairs of RHL till the date of his demise i.e. 25.01.2016 and thereafter the same were handled by his younger brother namely Prabhat Kumar Srivastava till 30.06.2016. The Rockland Group was managed by Late Rajesh Srivastava and his family. The petitioner was a close friend of Srivastavas and was given employment by Late Rajesh Srivastava on this account. After 30.06.2016, RHL was taken over by VPS Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. and on the wishes and directions of Late Mr. Rajesh Srivastava, the Applicant, was designated on paper as a Director of RHL and some other group companies. But since this was primarily an honorary position given to the petitioner, on account of his continued years of service he was never involved in the day-to-day affairs of the said companies and his Share Holding was negligible. The petitioner was never a Guarantor of the Loans obtained by RHL.
[3] The above said position of facts is squarely admitted by Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO) inasmuch as the SFIO itself admits that even though the petitioner was a whole time Director of RHL/A1, he was not a signatory to the Financial Statements of RHL/Al (Page no.34 of the I.O. Report). Further, the petitioner has been found NOT GUILTY of the alleged offence under Sections 129, 134 and 448 of Companies Act, 2013 in respect of alleged ‘False Statement in the Balance Sheets of RHL’ as per finding No.2 at Page No. 8 of complaint. In this regard, as per Section 134(1) Companies Act, 2013 the Balance Sheet of the company is required to be approved by the Board of Directors, meaning thereby that the SFIO admits that despite being a Director in the Board of RHL, the petitioner was not functioning as a decision making member of the Board of Directors and therefore he has admittedly not been held liable for alleged falsification of the balance sheets of the RHL.
[4] After the demise of Rajesh Srivastava (Founder Chairman and Managing Director of RHL), Prabhat Srivastava obtained a P.O.A from the petitioner in relation to sale of Shares of RHL in his personal capacity and also in the name of Aditya Medicose Private Limited. This fact also establishes that the petitioner was only an inconsequential paper director since this was primarily an honorary position given to the petitioner on account of his continued years of service and negligible shareholder.
[5] Mr.Rakesh Khanna and Mr.Vikas Pahwa, learned Senior Advocates appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that each and every director is not liable in criminal proceedings for the act of other director/offence committed. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Pooja Ravinder Devidasini vs. State of Maharastra & Anr. SLP No. 9133-39 of 2010 has held as under:
“…Simply because a person is a Director of a Company, does not make him liable… Every person connected with the Company will not fall into the ambit of the provision… A Director, who was not in charge of and was not responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company at the relevant time, will not be liable for an offence …In National Small Industries Corporation (supra) this Court observed… A company may have a number of Directors and to make any or all the Directors as accused in a complaint merely on the basis of a statement that they are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company without anything more is not a sufficient or adequate fulfilment of the requirements…”
[6] Further submitted that the petitioner is aware about the total consideration for purchase of 100% Shares of RHL considered by VPS Healthcare for Rs.650 crores and from the said Sale Consideration, a sum of Rs.430 Crores was paid off to the Banks in complete discharge of loans. The same is evident from the NOC dated 24.04.2017 issued by Lead Bank. Moreover, there is no complaint alleging cheating or misappropriation of their funds made against the petitioner by any Bank or financial institution, till date. In addition, all the banks and lenders of RHL that existed before the sale of the Company to VPS Healthcare had been duly paid back and no shareholder, creditor or lender has ever raised any complaints about any alleged siphoning off of funds. Moreover, VPS Healthcare owned RHL obtained fresh bank loan of Rs.400 crores from Federal Bank for running of the operations of the Company vide Sanction Letter dated 04.01.2017. However, petitioner is in no manner related to the said fresh bank loan, as he was neither the Borrower nor the Guarantor of the said new loan obtained by VPS Healthcare.
[7] Learned senior counsels further submitted that pursuant to the takeover of RHL by VPS Healthcare, various disputes arose between the parties and the same led to:
i. Passing of Order dated 20.01.2017 by this Court restraining the Srivastava Family and their agents including the petitioner from entering the premises of RHL, copy whereof is annexed with the petition as Annexure- 5.

ii. Passing of Direction under Section 156(3) for registration of an FIR against VPS Healthcare wherein one of the allegations was that VPS Healthcare has manipulated the records of RHL in order to lodge false complaints against its erstwhile Directors, copy of Order dated 23.08.2017 passed by Ld. M.M under section 156(3) is annexed with the petition as Annexure- 6.
iii. Complaint dated 07.11.2017 and 16.12.2017 to Registrar of Companies, filed by VPS led RHL in a bid to exert undue pressure on the erstwhile promoters of RHL, which were marked to S.F.I.O for investigation vide communication dated 31.05.2018 of the M.C.A., copy whereof is annexed with the petition as Annexure-7 (Colly).
[8] Subsequently, in the above said Complaint Case No.8519/2017 filed by Prabhat Kumar Srivastava, vide order dated 23.08.2017, directions for registration of a FIR against the functionaries of VPS HealthCare led RHL were passed by the Ld. M.M. Consequently, FIR No.81/2017 has been registered.
[9] Thereafter, on 02.02.2019, after lengthy trial of more than one and half years, examination and cross examination of all parties before Arbitral Tribunal comprising of the Ex-Chief Justice of India Mr. Justice T.S. Thakur and retired Judge of Supreme Court Mr. Aftab Alam, the disputes in relation to the accounts of RHL were resolved by the parties vide award dated 01.03.2019 wherein VPS Healthcare even paid settlement amount to the representatives of the shareholders of RHL in turn for the closure of disputes between them and undertook to withdraw all their complaints. In compliance of the same, VPS Healthcare moved a letter dated 28.03.2019 before the Registrar of Companies, Delhi requesting that all complaints filed by them be treated as withdrawn and proceedings be closed/dropped.

[10] However, pursuant to the investigation, petitioner was summoned on 17.01.2019, 26.11.2019, 29.11.2019 and 02.12.2019 to appear before the SFIO. Accordingly, he has complied with every summon and joined investigation as and when called by the investigating authorities. Further, on 02.12.2019, in response to a telephonic summon by the Respondent, petitioner appeared for questioning. However, even despite full assistance and cooperation given by him to the investigation, he was arrested at 8.00 pm. Thereafter, on 31.01.2019, the Investigation Report was filed before the Ld. Special Judge under Section 173 Cr.P.C. Pursuant to this, an application under Section 437 of the Cr.P.C. seeking the petitioner’s enlargement on regular bail was filed on 11.02.2020, however, vide order dated 02.03.2020, the Ld. Special Judge dismissed the same.
[11] Learned Senior Counsels argued that it is not a case where any public funds/ public interest is involved and that till date there has not been a single complainant or victim in the present case. Inasmuch as all the loans obtained by RHL, during the period the petitioner was its whole time Director, have been paid back in full. However, the allegation of the SFIO that even though the banks have been paid, at the time of disbursal of the loan, the banks were “deceived” on account of presentation of window-dressed accounts before the banks. The said fact falls flat on its face inasmuch as despite notice of the present case by SFIO, none of the banks have stated that they were deceived in any manner, hence, the alleged offences of S 36 (c) read with Section 447, 448 of the Companies Act, 2013 are prima facie not made out. Admittedly, the petitioner was neither the Borrower nor the Guarantor of the loan obtained by RHL.
[12] Further argued that no parallels can be drawn between the present case and the case of SFIO vs. Nitin Johri & Ors.,MANU/SC/1246/2019 as relied upon the Respondent since in the case of Nitin Johri, a staggering amount of about Rs.47,000 crores has been looted from the Banks and still remains unpaid whereas in the present case, an amount of Rs.430 crores has been taken on loan from the banks and has been repaid as far back as 1 ½ years before start of the investigation. However, the Ld. Special Judge has erroneously noted that the allegations against the accused are “prima facie were found to be supported by material in the form of documents and statements of witnesses”. It is submitted that there is not even a single document/e-mail communication on record to show that the petitioner was involved in the preparation of any alleged false implant bills. However, only the statements of two witnesses mention the name of the petitioner, one of whom is himself Accused No.9 and the other witness is an ex-employee (Ravinder Sharma) who himself is alleged to have prepared fake expenditure bills but he has not been made an accused. Therefore, these two solitary statements cannot be relied upon to reject the petitioner’s bail as the said two statements are also hopelessly un-corroborated with any material on record. However, the Ld. Special Court has failed to consider that even as per the Charge Sheet, against the alleged siphoned-off amount via alleged fake expenditure bills of Rs.76.03 crore, a class of patients namely Doctor Referred Patients (DRP) which have been alleged to be non-existent have deposited a total sum of Rs. 145.59 crores in RHL and the said amount has been used for the business of the company and not for any fraudulent purpose. Hence, the amount of money flowing in RHL is far more than the alleged siphoned-off amount.

[13] Learned senior counsels argued that the present proceedings originated from Complaints dated 07.11.2017 and 16.12.2017 filed by VPS Healthcare alleging siphoning of funds from RHL, have already been withdrawn vide Letters dated 28.03.2019. But the SFIO’s allegations that the present enquiry had been initiated on the basis of the report dated 19.02.2018 under Section 143(12), Companies Act, 2013 of the Auditor of VPS Healthcare led RHL (which was at logger heads with the petitioner at that time) is also not prima facie reliable inasmuch as the said Report issued by the Auditor is counter blast to the abovesaid FIR No.81/2017 dated 24.08.2017 lodged by the petitioner against VPS led RHL and the said Auditor on account of various facts such as preparation of balance sheet of RHL within a period of one day and manipulation of accounts/ financial statements. The SFIO’s allegation that the abovesaid report of the Auditor was thereafter considered by the ROC and Report dated 19.02.2018 under section 208 of the Companies Act, 2013 was issued by ROC whereby also falls flat as the said report did not recommend inquiry by SFIO.
[14] Further argued that SFIO has no jurisdiction to investigate the present matter since none of the pre-requisites that confer such jurisdiction upon the SFIO, exist in terms of Section 212 (a) (b) and (c). The petitioner was not arrested for almost 1 ½ years during investigation, which means that even the SFIO felt that there was no apprehension that he would abscond or hamper the investigation in any manner. The petitioner has been languishing in Judicial Custody for the past more than 92 Days and Charge Sheet/Complaint has also been filed. However, during the term of J.C., the petitioner was only made to join investigation at one instance, clearly demonstrating that he is not required for any investigation. Even assuming that the only apprehension qua the petitioner was that he might influence witness, however, now, since Charge Sheet/Complaint has been filed, the said apprehension of SFIO also cannot be said to be valid ground for him to continue in judicial custody. Therefore, bail should not be withheld as a punishment as observed in the case of Nagendra vs. King Emperor, 1924 AIR(Cal) 476. Moreover, since RHL, which is A-1 company has already been sold to VPS Healthcare Limited, there is no chance or possibility that the petitioner shall commit any similar offence while on bail.

[15] It is argued on behalf of the petitioner that he is a sick person aged 58 years, whose health is extremely fragile. He had been a chronic patient of Severely High Level of Diabetes and Blood Pressure. He had, therefore, undergone ‘Laparoscopic Sleeve Gastrectomy Surgery’ on 16.01.2015, Medical Record in this regard is Annexure-12 in the petition. Post surgery, a sterile and specific diet is required to be consumed by the petitioner and in ease of non-availability of the same, the petitioner is exposed to an imminent threat of cancer.
[16] Further argued that since the day of his arrest, due to non-availability of prescribed diet, the petitioner has lost 10.50 Kg of weight during custody, which, considering his medical condition and age, is an alarmingly high level of weight loss and his medical condition has severely deteriorated on this count also.
[17] In this regard, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dipak Shubhashchandra Mehta v. CBI, 2012 4 SCC 134 has observed that “we are conscious of the fact that the present appellant along with others is charged with economic offences of huge magnitude. At the same time, we cannot lose sight of the fact that though the investigating agency has completed the investigation and submitted the chargesheet including additional charge-sheet…. the presence of the appellant in custody may not be necessary for further investigation. In view of the same, considering the health condition as supported by the documents including the certificate of the Medical Officer, Central Jail Dispensary, we are of the view that the appellant is entitled to an order of bail pending trial on stringent conditions in order to safeguard the interest of CBI.” (Emphasis Supplied)

[18] Though Section 212(6) of the Companies Act, 2013 provides for satisfaction of the twin conditions for grant of regular bail, the proviso to Section 212(6) of the Companies Act, 2013 itself carves out an exception in cases where the Accused is Sick and the same reads as under:
(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973…
no person accused of any offence under those sections shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless-
(i)the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release; and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail:
Provided that a person, who, is under the age of sixteen years or is a woman or is sick or infirm, may be released on bail, if the Special Court so directs.”
[19] On the other hand, Ms.Maninder Acharya, learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that based on order dated 31.05.2018 issued by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) under section 212(1)(a)(b) & (c), an investigation into the affairs of RHL which is currently functioning under the name M/s Medeor Hospital Limited was conducted by SFIO. Prior to ordering investigation, the statutory auditor of RHL for FY 2016-17 had reported fraud to the central government by submitting ADT-4 dated 20.10.2017 to central government under section 143(12) of Companies Act, 2013. Subsequently, MCA directed Registrar of Companies(ROC) Delhi to conduct an inquiry u/s 208 of the Companies Act, 2013 into the affairs of Rockland Hospitals limited vide order dated 20.11.2017. In pursuance of the above-mentioned order ROC Delhi submitted its report under section 208 of Companies Act, 2013 on 19.02.2018 recommending investigation. Thereafter, the MCA, in exercise of its powers under Sections 212(1)(a), (b) & (c) and 219 of the Companies Act, 2013 vide Orders dated 31.05.2018 & 30.09.2019, assigned investigation into the affairs of Rockland Hospitals Ltd. (Now M/s. Medeor Hospital Ltd) and four other companies to SFIO. Accordingly, SFIO conducted investigation into the affairs of Rockland Hospitals Ltd. and four other companies and an investigation report was submitted on 24.01.2020 to MCA and MCA, vide its Letter No. Legal-35/1/2020 dated 30.01.2020 issued necessary directions to the SFIO to file and initiate prosecution against the accused persons. Accordingly, a Criminal Complaint bearing No. 149/2020 was filed before Ld. Special Judge (Companies Act), Dwarka District Courts, Delhi on 31.01.2020 and vide order dated 29.02.2020, the Ld. Special Judge was pleased to take cognizance of all the offences brought out in the Criminal Complaint against all accused persons.

[20] Ms.Acharya further submitted that during investigation two persons Prabhat Kumar Srivastava & Aditya Kumar Bhandari (petitioner herein) the erstwhile promoter-cum-Managing Director & promoter-cum-whole time Director were arrested under section 212(8) of Companies Act, 2013 on 02.12.2019. The investigation report dated 24.01.2020 had brought six (6) separate instances of fraud punishable under section 447 of Companies Act, 2013 against various persons. In five (5) of the six (6) instances the petitioner has been made an accused. Further, he has also been made an accused for violation of section 36(c) of Companies Act, 2013 which is also punishable under section 447 of Companies Act, 2013.
[21] Further submitted that Rockland Hospitals Limited (RHL) was a company incorporated in the year 2004. It was incorporated with the objective of carrying out the business of establishing and operating Hospitals. RHL had managed three (3) Hospitals, one at Qutub, Dwarka and Manesar. While the operations of hospital at Qutub was taken over by RHL in the FY 2008-09, hospital at Dwarka was made operational in the year 2011 and the hospital at Manesar started its operation in the year 2013. Accordingly, 100% shareholding of RHL was transferred by the shareholders i.e. promoters of RHL in the FY 2016-17 to VPS Health Care Private Limited for a consideration of Rs.165 Crores. The promoters including petitioner have committed inter-alia frauds by various manners:
I. Rockland Hospitals (Qutub) started its commercial operations from 2003-04 and was operated and managed by a trust Foundation of Applied Research in Cancer (FARC), the management and operations were transferred from FARC to RHL from 2008-09 onwards. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) directed RHL to deposit a sum of Rs. 13.21 Crores towards additional Floor Aspect Ratio (FAR) charges for the expansion of Hospital at Qutub Premises. Payment to MCD was made by RHL on 16.08.2011 by obtaining a special term loan of Rs. 13.22 Crore from the Union Bank of India. This loan was repaid in monthly instalments (EMI) by RHL. Subsequently, after various litigations, in compliance to order dated 14.01.2015 passed by this Court, MCD had made a refund of Rs.13.17 Crore paid towards additional FAR to the account of FARC on 26.03.2015. Since the amount was originally paid by RHL, the amount repaid by MCD ought to have been brought into the Profits and Loss Account, instead a structure was created to defraud RHL of Rs.13.17 Crore. On the same day i.e. 26.03.2015 the entire amount of Rs.13.17 Crore received from MCD was transferred to Rishi Kumar Srivastava (Trustee of FARC) in his personal Saving Bank Account No.344602010085186 and on the next day, the same amount of Rs.13.17 Crore was transferred from Rishi Kumar Srivastava to RHL and this transfer was shown as a unsecured loan advanced by Rishi Kumar Srivastava to RHL. Thus, a false facade was created to show that the amount has been transferred through Rishi Kumar Srivastava to RHL, whereas in truth RHL was burdened with an additional liability of Rs.13.17 Crore, the amount which otherwise belonged to RHL. However, RHL paid back the unsecured loan to Rishi Kumar Srivastava in the subsequent financial years. In fact, even after RHL had paid back the unsecured loan amount to Rishi Kumar Srivastava, against false liabilities created, RHL was still paying back the original loan amount (EMI) borrowed to pay MCD with interest till 17.07.2017.
II. The petitioner was one of the promoters, close associate of Srivastava’s and whole-time director of RHL between FY 2011-12 to FY 2014-15 when funds were deposited with MCD and when the refund from MCD was masqueraded and shown as unsecured loan repayable to Rishi Kumar Srivastava. He had signed the Management and Operations License Agreement (MOLA) on 14.02.2007 on behalf of RHL with FARC. He was the authorized representative of FARC in its legal matters and he filed the Writ Petition No.4195/2013 as authorized representative of FARC before this Court, seeking Refund of Rs. 13.17 Crore. He as part of the Board of Directors (BOD) approved acceptance of unsecured Loan of Rs.13.17 Crore from Rishi Kumar Srivastava on 28.03.2015. Thus, he being the whole-time director was having knowledge of accounts of RHL but, facilitated the Srivastava brothers in consummating their fraudulent scheme of siphoning off Rs. 13.17 Crore received for RHL by FARC for the undue enrichment of Rishi Kumar Srivastava.
III. RHL had maintained a Hospital Information System (HIS) wherein details of patients availing facilities/services at its hospitals were captured and these entries including patient registration, billing, discharge etc., are carried out by their respective departments. However only with respect to a category of patients called “Doctor Referred Patients (DRP)”, such entries were made by IT Team of RHL as per the instructions and knowledge of its MD Prabhat Kumar Srivastava and Group CFO Nikhil Sharma. The doctors whose names have been recorded in the HIS had stated under oath that such quantum or nature of surgeries conducted on DRP were false and fake, hence the DRP transactions were fictitious in nature and was one of the means for fudging the books of accounts. This was also substantiated by the various registers of Hospital such as OT Register, Cath Lab register maintained at the Hospitals.
IV. The petitioner was a part of audit committee of RHL in FY 2014-15 to FY 2015-16 and the audit committee is in charge of the Internal Financial Controls of the company as per section 177 of Companies Act, 2013 which include ascertaining and verifying the underlying transactions of the Revenue Source. Given that DRP formed about 40% revenue source of RHL, petitioner by act of omission to verify the revenue source had participated in the fudging of the revenue of RHL by addition of Fictitious DRP in the books of RHL.

V. The recovered email communications from RHL serves revealed that the promoters of RHL, Prabhat Kumar Srivastava, Aditya Kumar Bhandari (petitioner herein) & Nikhil Sharma (Group CFO) had directed the preparation of several implant bills. The emails revealed that RHL had routinely prepared these invoices of 3 rd parties pertaining to medical implants in a systematic manner. The emails further revealed that these invoices of 3rd parties were prepared subsequent to the date of payment of monies to these 3rd parties, which is illegal and not as per accepted business practice. The books and accounts of RHL and emails reveal that these monies were paid to 71 different accounts/entities between FY 2013-14 to FY 2015-16. The KYC documentation received from the banks also showed that these entities were majorly Sole Proprietorship & Partnerships firms. The books of accounts of the RHL and its bank statements reveal that a total amount of Rs. 76.03 Crore of RHL had been transferred as implant expenses against whom fake billings were created by RHL itself. Investigation revealed that these accounts were actually operated by accommodation entry operators, who masquerade the source and destination of funds by transferring entries through a web of parties.
VI. The petitioner as promoter and Whole Time Director of RHL during 2013-14 to FY 2015-16 had supervised the fake invoice generation by RHL as brought out in the statements of Tarun Kumar Jain Finance Manager & Ravinder Sharma, thus he had actively connived to book bogus expenses of Rs. 76.03 Crore in the Books of RHL. Further he had actually signed the banking instrument (Cheques/RTGS) etc., for siphoning the funds of RHL as authorized signatory to the Bank Accounts of RHL.
VII. During investigation, it is revealed that RHL had two major sources of funds between FY 2004-05 to FY 2015-16, which were borrowings from the Banks amounting to Rs.294.65 Crore and Share Capital Infusion of Rs.221.20 Crore. Share capital infusion brought into the books of RHL was Rs. 9.61 Crore, World Bank (IFC) had brought in Rs. 40 Crore and 21 Promoter Controlled Companies had brought in Rs. 168.38 Crore. While the net income earned by all promoters of RHL and their spouses shown in the income tax returns filed by them during the period 2005-06 to 2016-17 was Rs. 8.53 Crore only, however, they have shown to have infused share capital of Rs.179 Crores into RHL. The promoters of RHL had designed a dubious scheme whereby Rs. 168.38 Cr of share capital was brought into RHL through a web of 21 Companies controlled by them with the help of 266 accommodation entry operator-controlled companies spread across Delhi, West Bengal, Assam, Bihar, Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra, Orissa, Telangana, Tamil Nadu & Uttar Pradesh. The promoters of RHL had ultimately purchased 100% of shares of all Layer-1 Companies but without any consideration and they were unable to provide any documentary evidence for purchase of these shares from the original share subscribers or from any other party, including bank transactions and share transfer agreements. The modus operandi followed by the promoters was to transfer funds of RHL falsely as advances to Somya Constructions Private Limited (SCPL), RSH Meditech Systems Private Limited (RSH) towards capital expenditure or directly to various 3rd Parties as expenses. Subsequently SCPL or RSH (which were under the common control of the promoters) or 3rd Parties would use accommodation entry operators to layer and transfer these amounts to the 21 Layer 1 Companies, who would in turn invest the same into share capital of RHL. The accommodation entry operators follow the typical method of using various entities that they operate to layer and transfer the amounts involved from the source to the final destination, which in this case was the 21 Layer-1 companies. The above said modus operandii was followed by the promoters of RHL causing methodical falsification of books of accounts of RHL and by siphoning off the funds of RHL to only show that the promoters had infused a total share capital of Rs. 177.94 Crore into RHL, either by themselves or through 21- Layer 1 companies controlled by them. In this process the promoters had also systematically increased their ownership over RHL at the cost of its minority shareholder World Bank (IFC). The shares of RHL held by 21 Layer Companies were purchased from monies siphoned off from RHL and eventually the promoters disposed of these shares to VPS Health Care Private limited for a consideration of Rs.102.85 Crore resulting in unlawful gain to the promoters.

VIII. The petitioner as a whole time director of RHL, had overseen the dubious scheme of infusing Rs.168.38 crores share capital through a web of companies into RHL resulting in an unlawful gain to the promoters of Rs.102.85 Crore. He was also a director of Aditya Medicos Private Limited &Lipi Finstock Limited (2 of the 21 Layer-1 Companies) used by the promoters of RHL to siphon off funds of RHL and bring back the same in their own name to an extent of Rs.58.10 Crore (Rs. 5.64 Crore through Aditya Medicos Private Limited & Rs.52.46 Crore through LipiFinstock Limited). Personal gain by petitioner & his family in the above modus operandii is Rs. 5.03 Crore (Rs. 3.69 Crore in his name & Rs.1.34 Crore in his spouse name) by holding shares in Aditya Medicose Private Ltd, Mona Infotech Pvt. Ltd, Prabhat Healthcare Services Pvt Ltd, Regal Builders & Promotes Pvt. Ltd, Umesh Pharmaceuticals Pvt.Ltd, A.B. Medicos Pvt. Ltd, Vaibhav India Surgicals Pvt Ltd (7 of the 21 Layer-1 Companies).
IX. On 06.06.2008 IFC, World Bank had invested Rs.40 Crore in the equity share capital of RHL and by deceit, fraudulent conduct of business and act of omission IFC was made to sell the shares it had purchased at Rs. 40 Crore at Rs.11 Crore to Mala Srivastava on 27.06.2016 and these shares were resold to VPS Health Care Private Limited at a price of Rs.19.15 Cr on 29.06.2016 thus obtaining an unlawful gain of Rs.8.14 Cr. The purchase and resale of share of IFC was not just in violations of provisions of the share purchase agreement and share sale agreement but also against the duty cast on directors of RHL Mala Srivastava & Prabhat Kumar Srivastava who had the fiduciary duty of protecting the interest of all the shareholders as laid down in section 166 of Companies Act, 2013 which states that a director of a company shall act in good faith in order to promote the objects of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in the best interests of the company, its employees, the shareholders. However the promoters had with full knowledge of sale of share of RHL to VPS Health Care Private Limited, and had abused their position in RHL by conniving to defraud the minority shareholder(IFC), which falls squarely under the definition of fraud as it includes act of omission, concealment of any fact or abuse of position committed by the directors of the company Mala Srivastava and Prabhat Kumar Srivastava with intent to deceive, to gain undue advantage from, or to injure the interests of, its shareholders and hence were made accused under section 447 of Companies Act, 2013.
X. Investigation revealed that the promoters of RHL had created a category of false patients DRP in order to inflate the revenue of the company and amounts receivable from debtors, for instance the financial statements for FY 2015-16 disclose the total trade receivable as on 31.03.2016 as Rs. 27.13 Crores, however, month wise representation given by company signed by Prabhat Kumar Srivastava as MD of RHL, for obtaining working capital shows the value of debtors (DRP) of the company as Rs.89.87 crores to Rs.141.84 crores between June 2015 to March 2016, which is a materially false statement before the banks so as to receive additional credit.
XI. The petitioner was the promoter director of RHL and had connived with Prabhat Kumar Srivastava to systematically manipulate revenue pertaining to DRP and was on the board of directors that had authorized Prabhat Kumar Srivastava to file false statements before financial institutions on behalf of the Board of Directors of RHL for borrowing of public funds through false representation.
XII. A tabulation of all nine (9) persons accused of section 447 and section 36(c) of Companies Act, 2013 in the above said 7 instances is shown below:

S. No .
Name of Persons
Accused No.
MCD
DRP
BOGUS EXPENSES
SHARE CAPITAL
RHOL
IFC
BANKS
1.
Prabhat Kumar Srivastava
A4
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
2.
Aditya Kumar Bhandari
A6
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
3.
Rishi Kumar Srivastava
A5
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
4.
Nikhil Sharma
A7
  
Y
Y
 
 
 
 
5.
Bipin Joshi
A8
 
Y
 
 
 
 
 
6.
Tarun Kumar Jain
A9
 
 
Y
 
 
 
 
7.
Mala Srivastava
A10
 
 
 
 
 
Y
 
8.
Sandeep Narula
A11
 
Y
  
 
 
 
 
9.
Sandeep Khosla
A20
 
Y
 
 
 
 
 
[22] To strengthen her arguments, learned Additional Solicitor has relied upon the case of Serious Fraud Investigation Office vs. Nittin Johari & Ors., 2019 AIR(SC) 4380, wherein Hon’ble the Supreme Court has observed as under:
“10. It is pertinent to begin our discussion by referring to the mandatory conditions imposed under Section 212(6)(ii) for the grant of bail in connection with offences under Section 447 of the Companies Act. Sub-clause (ii) of Section 212(6) reads as follows:
“(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), offence covered under section 447 of this Act shall be cognizable and no person accused of any offence under those sections shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless-
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail” Although arguments have been advanced touching upon the scope and validity of the above provision, particularly in the aftermath of the decision of this Court in Nikesh Tarachand Shah (supra) pertaining to a similar provision in the PMLA, we do not find it appropriate to make any observations in this regard in light of the pendency of the challenge to the constitutionality of the said provision of the Companies Act before this Court.

  1. At this juncture, it must be noted that even as per Section 212(7) of the Companies Act, the limitation under Section 212(6) with respect to grant of bail is in addition to those already provided in the Cr.P.C. Thus, it is necessary to advert to the principles governing the grant of bail under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C. Specifically, heed must be paid to the stringent view taken by this Court towards grant of bail with respect of economic offences. In this regard, it is pertinent to refer to the following observations of this Court in Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy (supra):
    “34. Economic offences constitute a class apart and need to be visited with a different approach in the matter of bail. The economic offences having deep- rooted conspiracies and involving huge loss of public funds need to be viewed seriously and considered as grave offences affecting the economy of the country as a whole and thereby posing serious threat to the financial health of the country.
  1. While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public/State and other similar considerations.” This Court has adopted this position in several decisions, including Gautam Kundu v. Directorate of Enforcement (Prevention of Money Laundering Act), Government of India, 2015 16 SCC 1, and State of Bihar v. Amit Kumar, 2017 13 SCC 751. Thus, it is evident that the above factors must be taken into account while determining whether bail should be granted in cases involving grave economic offences.
  2. As already discussed supra, it is apparent that the Special Court, while considering the bail applications filed by Respondent No. 1 both prior and subsequent to the filing of the Investigation Report and complaint, has attempted to account not only for the conditions laid down in Section 212(6) of the Companies Act, but also of the general principles governing the grant of bail.
  3. In our considered opinion, the High Court in the impugned order has failed to apply even these general principles. The High Court, after referring to certain portions of the complaint to ascertain the alleged role of Respondent No. 1, came to the conclusion that the role attributed to him was merely that of colluding with the co-accused promoters in the commission of the offence in question. The Court referred to the principles governing the grant of bail as laid down by this Court in Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsingh Sharma v. State of Maharashtra, 2005 5 SCC 294, which discusses the effect of the twin mandatory conditions pertaining to the grant of bail for offences under the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 as laid down in Section 21(4) thereof, similar to the conditions embodied in Section 212(6)(ii) of the Companies Act. However, the High Court went on to grant bail to Respondent No.1 by observing that bail was justified on the “broad probabilities” of the case.
    In our considered opinion, this vague observation demonstrates non-application of mind on the part of the Court even under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C., even if we keep aside the question of satisfaction of the mandatory requirements under Section 212(6)(ii) of the Companies Act.”\

[23] She further relied upon the case of P. Chidambaram vs. Directorate of Enforcement,MANU/SSC/1670/2019, wherein Hon’ble the Supreme Court has held as under:
“21. Thus from cumulative perusal of the judgments cited on either side including the one rendered by the Constitution Bench of this Court, it could be deduced that the basic jurisprudence relating to bail remains the same inasmuch as the grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception so as to ensure that the accused has the opportunity of securing fair trial. However, while considering the same the gravity of the offence is an aspect which is required to be kept in view by the Court. The gravity for the said purpose will have to be gathered from the facts and circumstances arising in each case. Keeping in view the consequences that would befall on the society in cases of financial irregularities, it has been held that even economic offences would fall under the category of “grave offence” and in such circumstance while considering the application for bail in such matters, the Court will have to deal with the same, being sensitive to the nature of allegation made against the accused. One of the circumstances to consider the gravity of the offence is also the term of sentence that is prescribed for the offence the accused is alleged to have committed. Such consideration with regard to the gravity of offence is a factor which is in addition to the triple test or the tripod test that would be normally applied. In that regard what is also to be kept in perspective is that even if the allegation is one of grave economic offence, it is not a rule that bail should be denied in every case since there is no such bar created in the relevant enactment passed by the legislature nor does the bail jurisprudence provides so. Therefore, the underlining conclusion is that irrespective of the nature and gravity of charge, the precedent of another case alone will not be the basis for either grant or refusal of bail though it may have a bearing on principle. But ultimately the consideration will have to be on case to case basis on the facts involved therein and securing the presence of the accused to stand trial.”
[24] Learned ASG submitted that while granting bail twin test to be tested in the present case as held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court, in this case, petitioner has played active role in committing fraud, therefore, he does not deserve bail.
[25] I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the material available on record.
[26] The allegations against the petitioner are that he was one of the promoters and close associate of Srivastava’s and whole time director of RHL between financial year 2011-12 to 2014-15 when funds were deposited with MCD and when the refund from MCD was masqueraded and shown as unsecured loan repayable to Rishi Kumar Srivastava. The petitioner had signed the Management and Operations Licence Agreement (MOLA) on 14.02.2007 on behalf of RHL with FARC. He was the authorized representative of FARC in its legal matters and he filed the Writ Petition No.4195/2013 of FARC, seeking refund of Rs.13.17 crores. He as part of the Board of Directors (BoD) approved acceptance of Unsecured Loans of Rs.13.17 crores from Rishi Kumar Srivastava on 28.03.2015. Thus, petitioner being the whole time Director was having knowledge of accounts of RHL and facilitated the Srivastava brothers in consummating their fraudulent scheme of siphoning off Rs. 13.17 Crores received for RHL by FARC for the undue enrichment of Rishi Kumar Srivastava.
[27] Further allegations against the petitioner are that RHL had maintained a Hospital Information System (HIS) wherein details of patients availing facilities/services at its hospitals were captured and these entries including patient registration, billing, discharge etc., are carried out by their respective departments. However, only with respect to a category of patients called DRP, such entries were made by IT Team of RHL as per the instructions and knowledge of its MD Prabhat Kumar Srivastava and Group CFO Nikhil Sharma. However, the doctors whose names have been recorded in the HIS had stated under oath that such quantum or nature of surgeries conducted on DRP were false and fake. Hence, the DRP transactions were fictitious in nature and were one of the means for fudging the books of accounts.
[28] The above said fact has been substantiated by the records of hospital itself. Moreover, the e-mail communications gathered at the time of investigation reveal that both Prabhat Kumar Srivastava and Group CFO Nikhil Sharma had supervised/directed manipulation of the patient pertaining to DRP recorded in the system. Thus, given that DRP formed about 40% revenue source of RHL, but act of omission to verify the revenue source, petitioner had participated in fudging of the revenue of RHL by addition of fictitious DRP in the books of RHL.

[29] It is further alleged against the petitioner that as promoter and Whole Time Director of RHL during financial year 2013 to financial year 2016 had supervised the fake invoice generation by RHL as brought out in the statements of Tarun Kumar Jain, Finance Manager & Ravinder Sharma, thus, the petitioner had actively connived to book bogus expenses of Rs.76.03 Crore in the Books of RHL. Further he had actually signed the banking instrument (Cheques/RTGS) etc., for siphoning the funds of RHL as authorized signatory to the Bank Accounts of RHL.
[30] During investigation, it is revealed that RHL had two major sources of funds between FY 2004-05 to FY 2015-16, which were borrowings from the Banks amounting to Rs.294.65 Crore and Share Capital Infusion of Rs.221.20 Crore. Share capital infusion brought into the books of RHL was Rs. 9.61 Crore, World Bank (IFC) had brought in Rs. 40 Crore and 21 Promoter Controlled Companies had brought in Rs. 168.38 Crore. While the net income earned by all promoters of RHL and their spouses shown in the Income Tax Returns filed by them during the period 2005-06 to 2016-17 was Rs. 8.53 Crore only, however, they have shown to have infused share capital of Rs.179 Crores into RHL. Thus, promoters of RHL had designed a dubious scheme whereby Rs. 168.38 Crore of share capital was brought into RHL through a web of 21 Companies controlled by them with the help of 266 accommodation entry operator-controlled companies spread across the country. The promoters of RHL had ultimately purchased 100% of shares of all Layer-1 Companies but without any consideration and they were unable to provide any documentary evidence for purchase of these shares from the original share subscribers or from any other party, including bank transactions and share transfer agreements. The modus operandi followed by the promoters was to transfer funds of RHL falsely as advances to Somya Constructions Private Limited (SCPL), RSH Meditech System Private Limited (RSH) towards capital expenditure or directly to various 3rd Parties as expenses. Subsequently, SCPL or RSH or 3rd Parties would use accommodation entry operators to layer and transfer these amounts to the 21 Layer-1 Companies, who would in turn invest the same into share capital of RHL. The above said modus operandii was followed by the promoters of RHL causing methodical falsification of books of accounts of RHL and by siphoning off the funds of RHL to only show that the promoters had infused a total share capital of Rs. 177.94 Crore into RHL, either by themselves or through 21- Layer 1 companies controlled by them.
[31] In addition to above, there are other serious allegations of fraud committed by the promoters as submitted by Ms.Maninder Acharya, learned Additional Solicitor General. However, personal allegation against the petitioner is that by the whole modus-operandi the personal gain is Rs.05.03 crore (Rs.3.69 crore in his name and Rs.1.34 crore in his spouse name) by holding shares in Aditya Medicose Pvt. Ltd., Mona Infotech Pvt. Ltd., Umesh Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. Prabhat Healthcare Services Pvt. Ltd., A.B. Medicos Pvt. Ltd., Vaibhav India Surgicals Pvt. Ltd. (7 of the 21 Layer 1 companies).

[32] In my opinion, sections 210 and 212 of the Companies Act, 2013 are relevant to establish that Central Government has power to investigate into the affairs of a company, which are reproduced as under:
Section 210: Investigation into Affairs of Company: (1) Where the Central Government is of the opinion, that it is necessary to investigate into the affairs of a company,-
(a) on the receipt of a report of the Registrar or inspector under section 208;
(b) on intimation of a special resolution passed by a company that the affairs of the company ought to be investigated; or
(c) in public interest, it may order an investigation into the affairs of the company.
(2) Where an order is passed by a court or the Tribunal in any proceedings before it that the affairs of a company ought to be investigated, the Central Government shall order an investigation into the affairs of that company.
(3) For the purposes of this section, the Central Government may appoint one or more persons as inspectors to investigate into the affairs of the company and to report thereon in such manner as the Central Government may direct.”
Section 212: Investigation into affairs of Company by Serious Fraud Investigation Office: (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of section 210, where the Central Government is of the opinion, that it is necessary to investigate into the affairs of a company by the Serious Fraud Investigation Office-
(a) on receipt of a report of the Registrar or inspector under section 208;
(b) on intimation of a special resolution passed by a company that its affairs are required to be investigated;
(c) in the public interest; or
(d) on request from any Department of the Central Government or a State Government, the Central Government may, by order, assign the investigation into the affairs of the said company to the Serious Fraud Investigation Office and its Director, may designate such number of inspectors, as he may consider necessary for the purpose of such investigation.
(2) Where any case has been assigned by the Central Government to the Serious Fraud Investigation Office for investigation under this Act, no other investigating agency of Central Government or any State Government shall proceed with investigation in such case in respect of any offence under this Act and in case any such investigation has already been initiated, it shall not be proceeded further with and the concerned agency shall transfer the relevant documents and records in respect of such offences under this Act to Serious Fraud Investigation Office.
(3) Where the investigation into the affairs of a company has been assigned by the Central Government to Serious Fraud Investigation Office, it shall conduct the investigation in the manner and follow the procedure provided in this Chapter; and submit its report to the Central Government within such period as may be specified in the order.
(4) The Director, Serious Fraud Investigation Office shall cause the affairs of the company to be investigated by an Investigating Officer who shall have the power of the inspector under section 217.
(5) The company and its officers and employees, who are or have been in employment of the company shall be responsible to provide all information, explanation, documents and assistance to the Investigating Officer as he may require for conduct of the investigation.

(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the offences covered under sub-sections (5) and (6) of section 7, section 34, section 36, sub-section (1) of section 38, sub-section (5) of section 46, sub-section (7) of section 56, sub-section (10) of section 66, sub-section (5) of section 140, sub-section (4) of section 206, section 213, section 229, sub-section (1) of section 251, sub-section (3) of section 339 and section 448 which attract the punishment for fraud provided in section 447 of this Act shall be cognizable and no person accused of any offence under those sections shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless-
(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release; and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail:
Provided that a person, who, is under the age of sixteen years or is a woman or is sick or infirm, may be released on bail, if the Special Court so directs:
Provided further that the Special Court shall not take cognizance of any offence referred to this sub-section except upon a complaint in writing made by-
(i) the Director, Serious Fraud Investigation Office; or
(ii) any officer of the Central Government authorised, by a general or special order in writing in this behalf by that Government.
(7) The limitation on granting of bail specified in sub-section (6) is in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail.
(8) If the Director, Additional Director or Assistant Director of Serious Fraud Investigation Office authorised in this behalf by the Central Government by general or special order, has on the basis of material in his possession reason to believe (the reason for such belief to be recorded in writing) that any person has been guilty of any offence punishable under sections referred to in sub-section (6), he may arrest such person and shall, as soon as may be, inform him of the grounds for such arrest.
(9) The Director, Additional Director or Assistant Director of Serious Fraud Investigation Office shall, immediately after arrest of such person under sub-section (8), forward a copy of the order, along with the material in his possession, referred to in that sub-section, to the Serious Fraud Investigation Office in a sealed envelope, in such manner as may be prescribed and the Serious Fraud Investigation Office shall keep such order and material for such period as may be prescribed.
(10) Every person arrested under sub-section (8) shall within twenty-four hours, be taken to a Judicial Magistrate or a Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, having jurisdiction:

Provided that the period of twenty-four hours shall exclude the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Magistrate’s court.
(11) The Central Government if so directs, the Serious Fraud Investigation Office shall submit an interim report to the Central Government.
(12) On completion of the investigation, the Serious Fraud Investigation Office shall submit the investigation report to the Central Government.
(13) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, a copy of the investigation report may be obtained by any person concerned by making an application in this regard to the court.
(14) On receipt of the investigation report, the Central Government may, after examination of the report (and after taking such legal advice, as it may think fit), direct the Serious Fraud Investigation Office to initiate prosecution against the company and its officers or employees, who are or have been in employment of the company or any other person directly or indirectly connected with the affairs of the company.
(15) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, the investigation report filed with the Special Court for framing of charges shall be deemed to be a report filed by a police officer under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
(16) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, any investigation or other action taken or initiated by Serious Fraud Investigation Office under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 shall continue to be proceeded with under that Act as if this Act had not been passed.
(17) (a) In case Serious Fraud Investigation Office has been investigating any offence under this Act, any other investigating agency, State Government, police authority, income-tax authorities having any information or documents in respect of such offence shall provide all such information or documents available with it to the Serious Fraud Investigation Office;
(b) The Serious Fraud Investigation Office shall share any information or documents available with it, with any investigating agency, State Government, police authority or income tax authorities, which may be relevant or useful for such investigating agency, State Government, police authority or income-tax authorities in respect of any offence or matter being investigated or examined by it under any other law.”
[33] Regarding medical condition of the petitioner, as per reports dated 06.03.2020, 18.03.2020 & 17.04.2020 show that the Petitioner is a case of Diabetes with a history of Laparospic sleeve gastrectomy surgery on 16.01.2015 and is receiving all medications as prescribed and his condition is stable. In fact, attention is drawn to the following aspects of the report given by the medical officer:
a) Petitioner didn’t require any hospitalization during the judicial custody (Report dated 17.04.2020 Para b)
b) Petitioner has never been sent to hospital outside jail premises (Report dated 06.03.2020 Para 3)
c) Petitioner is getting all requisite medication (Report dated 06.03.2020 Para 4 & Report dated 17.04.2020 Para c)
d) Petitioner’s condition is stable (Report dated 06.03.2020 Para 5 & Report dated 17.04.2020 Para c).
[34] The medical opinion of the jail doctor dated 30.04.2020 on whether or not the petitioner’s susceptibility to Corona virus disease (COVID-19) is high given the fact that he is incarcerated is that “The inmate is not having any higher susceptibility of getting infected by COVID 19 due to incarceration in the jail environment. However, as per the prevailing conditions and general outcome it has been noted that the patients with diabetes, hypertension, heart disease etc. tend to have increased tendency to develop serious COVID 19 disease.”
[35] The medical opinion of the jail doctors dated 30.04.2020 on the issue of his weight loss points out that:
a) The Petitioners weight was completely stable at 78 Kgs since 17.02.2020 to 29.04.2020. The opinion also states that the inmate has maintained the same weight for the last 2 months and necessary treatment was provided to him.
b) The petitioner when taken into custody was 90 Kgs and had lost weight in the initial phase of custody due to reduced capacity of the stomach which leads to reduced intake of food, in addition some inmates also tend to lose weight in the initial phase of jail incarceration due to stress and change in diet.
c) Routine investigations were within normal limits.
[36] Thus, the medical report shows that the susceptibility of the petitioner to COVID 19 due to incarceration is not higher and further the contention of the petitioner that he had lost 13 kgs in the last 3 months is false, rather his weight had been constant at 78 Kgs for the last 73 days which is within the normal limits (between 17.02.2020 to 29.04.2020). Further, considering that the petitioner is being given all required medical treatment by the Jail Authorities and that his condition is stable from the last two months, it is established that the petitioner is not having any higher susceptibility of getting infected by COVID 19 due to incarceration in the jail environment.
[37] Also considering that the height of the petitioner is around 6 feet and his present weight is 78kgs, the Body Mass Index (BMI) of the petitioner is 23.5 Kg/M Sq. Given that the healthy/normal BMI range prescribed by WHO is between 18.5 Kg/M Sq. to 25 Kg/M Sq., by no stretch of imagination can the petitioner be termed as underweight. In fact, the ideal weight range for the petitioners height is between 62 & 82 Kgs.
[38] In view of above, I am of the considered opinion that there are no medical grounds available to the petitioner for grant of bail.

[39] It is pertinent to mention here that vide order dated 20.04.2020 while disposing of the Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.5825/2020 and thereby allowing urgent hearing of present bail application (through video conferencing) directed the respondent to file the status report in the matter under consideration more specifically, showing the difference between the role of the petitioner herein against that of accused nos.5, 7 to 11 and 20. As per the above tabulation of 9 accused, they all are booked under section 447 and section 36(c) of Companies Act, 2013 in the 7 instances of Fraud as per status report. However, on perusal of said table, role of petitioner and role of Rishi Kumar Srivastava (A-5) is same. But A-5 has not been arrested and chargesheet has already been filed. However, there is no explanation to this effect. As per the table, role of accused nos.7 to 11 & 20 are very less, therefore, there is justification on not arresting them.
[40] It is pertinent to mention here that in respect of Finding No.1- Instance VI, the petitioner has not been arraigned as an accused. However, in respect of Finding No. 2 and 3, the SFIO itself has found the petitioner NOT GUILTY of the alleged offence under Sections 129, 134 and 448 of Companies Act, 2013 in respect of alleged ‘False Statement in the Balance Sheets of RHL’, despite the fact that the petitioner was a Director of RHL for the relevant period (Finding No. 2 at page No. 8 of the Complaint), he cannot in any manner be accused of Section 36 (C) of the Companies’ Act, 2013 i.e. allegedly having represented any False Financial Statement/Information to the Banks in as much as admittedly he had no role in the preparation of the said Financial Statements.
[41] Be that it as may, in any case, admittedly, the petitioner had no role to play with the banks inasmuch as the petitioner was not a guarantor to any bank loan of RHL. In any case, the banks have not filed any complaint with regard to having been deceived, rather, admittedly, the entire outstanding of the bank has been cleared.
[42] In respect of Finding Nos. 4 to 9, the same are bailable and hence the same are not required to be considered for the adjudication of the present bail application at this juncture.
[43] After going through the status report and considering the arguments advanced by learned Additional Solicitor General, Ms.Maninder Acharya, the main beneficiary of all the 7 instances of fraud is Prabhat Kumar Srivastava and his family. The petitioner herein has received peanuts through interest in shares. All directors and promoters are equally liable, therefore, cannot be different parameter for petitioner and other promoters.
[44] In the case of Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy vs. CBI, 2013 7 SCC 439, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that “while granting bail, the Court has to keep in mind the factors like the nature of accusation, evidence in support thereof, the severity of punishment which conviction will entail, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused during trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tempered with, the large interests of the public/state and other similar considerations.”
[45] It is pertinent to mention here that SFIO itself admits that even though the petitioner was a whole time Director of RHL/A-1, he was not signatory to the Financial Statements of said company. Further, petitioner has been found NOT GUILTY of the alleged offence under sections 129, 134 and 448 of Companies Act, 2013 in respect of alleged “False Statement in the Balance Sheet of RHL as per finding No.2 at page 8 of complaint.’
[46] Admittedly, there is no loss caused either to any financial institution or Central/State Government. Moreover, there is no complaint from any share holders. Whereas, in case of Nittin Johary (supra,) huge loss has been caused to the Banks, shareholders and other stake holders. Moreover, in the present case under section 447 the Companies Act, if fraud is proved, the accused shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend upto ten years and fine not less than the amount involved. Thus the judgments relied upon by the respondent are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case as petitioner is concerned.
[47] It is not in dispute that investigation is complete, criminal complaint has been filed and charges are yet to be framed. Presently, our country is under “Lock-down’ due to COVID-19, therefore, regular functioning of the courts may take more time. Thus, in the present situation, trial of the present case is not possible in the near future. Further, there is no allegations that petitioner is flight risk or may temper with the evidence or influence the witnesses.
[48] Since present application is for bail, therefore, this Court refrains from making any observation on the merit of the prosecution case, which is subject matter of the Trial. However, in view of above facts and considering the period in judicial custody, this Court is of the view that petitioner deserves for bail.
[49] Accordingly, he shall be released on bail subject to his furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs.50,000/- before the concerned Jail Superintendent and a surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of Trial Court as and when, the Court starts its regular functioning.
[50] He shall not leave the country without permission of the Trial Court.
[51] The Trial Court shall not get influenced by the observation made by this Court while passing the order.
[52] In view of above, present bail application is allowed and disposed of.
[53] Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.
[54] Copy of this order be transmitted to learned counsel for the parties through e-mail.
[55] A copy of the same shall also be sent to the Jail Superintendent concerned and Trial Court for compliance.

The article is being written by Advocate Vikas Nagwan

Court has to decide bail application

Whenever an accused appears before the court or is brought before the court, he/she has the option to apply for bail. In such cases when the bail application is filed, the court has to first ascertain whether the offence the person is accused of, is bailable or  non bailable. In bailable offence or bailable cases, the accused can get the bail from police station itself as per the mandate of section 436 CrPC if the accused is ready to furnish bail and furnishes bail.  In cases of non bailable offences the grant of bail is a discretion of the court.

In State versus Captain Joginder Singh 1961 Supreme court ash observed that “Whenever an application for bail is made to a court, the first question that it has to decide is whether the, offence, for which the accused is being prosecuted is bailable or otherwise. If the offence, is bailable, hail will be granted, under s. 496 of the Code of Criminal Procedure without more ado ; but if the offence is not bailable, further considerations will arise and the court will decide the question of grant of bail in the light of those further considerations.”

Section 436 provides for the bail in bailable offences whereas section 437 CrPC provides for bail in non bailable offences. In such cases the court shall adhere to the principles provided under section 437 CrPC.

In non bailable offences, the Magistrate may release the accused under section 437 CrPC whereas the Court of session or the Hon’ble High court may release the applicant under section 439 CrPC.

Bail granted in Corruption case

Gauhati High court recently has granted bail in a corruption case in the matter of Gautam Baruwa versus The state of assam 2021 wherein the accused was arrested an has prayed for granting him regular bail, in connection with CM’s Special Vigilance Cell Police Station Case No. 9/2017, under Sections 120(B)/406/409/468/471/420 IPC, read with Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 which involves a cumulative amount of Rs. 121 crores.

The Hon’ble high court also quoted the decision of the apex court in Deepak S Mehta -Vs- CBI; wherein the bail has been granted under Section 439 CrPC, considering that where there is delay in trial, bail should not be denied. Paragraph-19 is quoted below:-
“As observed earlier, we are conscious of the fact that the present appellant along with others are charged with economic offences of huge magnitude. At the same time, we cannot lose sight of the facts though the investigating agency has completed the investigation and submitted the charge sheet including the additional charge sheet, the fact remains that the necessary charges have not been framed. Therefore, the presence of the appellant in custody may not be necessary for further investigation. In view of the same, considering the health condition as supported by the documents, including the certificate of the medical officer, we are of the view that the appellant is entitled to an order of bail, pending trial on stringent conditions, in order to safeguard the interest of CBI.

Bail in cases of non bailable offences is a discretion of the court as per the various decisions of the Hon’ble court the punishment starts after conviction.

Read full judgement below:
Gauhati High Court
Gautam Baruwa vs The State Of Assam on 8 February, 2021
                                                                                    Page No.# 1/6

GAHC010175182020




                               THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
     (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)

                                 Case No. : Bail Appln./2718/2020

             GAUTAM BARUWA
             S/O LT KSHIRODA KANTA BARUWA, R/O FLAT NO. F-4, CHANDRALAYA
             APARTMENT, LAMB ROAD,AMBARI, P.S. LATASIL GUWAHATI-781001,
             DIST. KAMRUP (M), ASSAM



             VERSUS

             THE STATE OF ASSAM
             REP. BY THE PP, ASSAM



Advocate for the Petitioner    : MR. A CHAUDHURY

Advocate for the Respondent : PP, ASSAM


                                              BEFORE
                     HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE RUMI KUMARI PHUKAN
                                      ORDER
08.02.2021 By this application under Section 439 CrPC, petitioner, namely, Sri Gautam Baruwa, who was arrested on 25.02.2020, has prayed for granting him regular bail, in connection with CM's Special Vigilance Cell Police Station Case No. 9/2017, under Sections 120(B)/406/409/468/471/420 IPC, read with Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 
2. Heard Mr A Choudhury, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr N K Kalita, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State of Assam. 
Page No.# 2/6 
3. The LCR, along with the status report submitted by the learned Presiding Officer has been produced. 
4. Pursuant to an allegation received from the erstwhile Labour Commissioner, Tapan Chandra Sarma, to the effect that during the years 2013-2016, the then Labour Commissioner -cum- Member Secretary and the Chairman and other staff of Assam Building and Other Construction Workers Welfare Board (in short, "ABOCWWB"), Guwahati, illegally incurred huge expenditure in printing leaflets, folders and booklets for awareness campaign and also printing of forms and registers without receiving indent from the Field Officers, violating the prescribed limits, an enquiry was conducted by the Inspector of Police, CM's Vigilance Cell and on the basis of self conducted enquiry by Inspector, Mrinal Sarma, the FIR was lodged, alleging that the FIR named accused persons were involved in printing of various forms and other items for three successive years, in the name of publicity of campaign for labour awareness, which involves a cumulative amount of Rs. 121 crores, while disbursing the work to the particular firms, large scale collusion is alleged to have been indulged into, in the form of manipulation of floating tenders in inflated rates and thereby, causing wrongful loss to the State exchequer and wrongful gain to the accused persons. The aforesaid FIR was registered as SVC Case No. 9/2017, under Sections 120(B)/406/409/468/471/420 IPC, read with Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, against- 1) Chohan Doley, IAS, the then Labour Commissioner 
-cum- Member Secretary, 2) Gautam Baruwa, the Chairman of ABOCWWB, 3) N N Choudhury, Administrative Officer of the Board, 4) Priyanshu Bairagi, Proprietor of Purbashree Printing House, Patacharkuchi, 5) Officials of Sarba Siksha Abhijan Mission, Assam. 
5. During investigation three accused persons, Chohan Doley, N N Choudhury and Priyangshu Bairagi were arrested and charge sheet was also laid against them, pending further investigation under Section 173 (A) of CrPC. Those three accused persons were subsequently released on bail. Present accused person, Gautam Baruwa, who is stated to have absconded at the initial stage, but, later on, he was also arrested on 24.02.2020 and, thereafter, were sent to judicial custody and charge sheet was also laid against him, after obtaining prosecution sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC. The learned trial Court in its status report has submitted that prosecution sanction as regards the other accused, Chohan Doley is not yet furnished under Section 19 of the PC Act and the proposal has been sent by the Secretary to the Government of India to the Prime Minister's office in this regard. Soon after obtaining the prosecution sanction order against Chohan Doley, the learned Court will consider the matter of taking cognizance of offences against the accused persons. 
Page No.# 3/6 
6. Thus, from the matters on record and the LCR, it reveals that the charge sheet has already been laid against all the accused persons at different stages and the case is pending for taking cognizance. 
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted before this Court that all remaining charge sheeted accused(s), except the present petitioner, have been granted bail by this Court as well as the trial Court and the bail prayer of the present accused petitioner should also be considered, in view of length of detention and as a matter of parity. Different bail order(s) of those accused persons have been pressed into as well as other bail order(s), passed by this Court in some other cases regarding the APSC case etc., where this Court granted the bail to co-accused(s) on the ground of parity and length of detention. 
8. Referred decisions annexed are gone through and also the LCR to assess the status of the case. 
9. In support of the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court have been submitted, wherein the Hon'ble Court has granted bail considering the length of detention in custody, without trial:- 
1) In (2000) 9 SCC 443; Vivek Kumar -Vs- State of UP, bail under Section 439 CrPC (in an offence under Sections 394/395 read with Section 149 IPC) was granted by holding that the accused person is in custody for a quiet long period without commencing the trial and there is no need to detain him in further custody. 
2) In (2002) 10 SCC 403; Sanjay @ Bablu -Vs- State of Gujarat, bail under Section 439 CrPC, (in an offence under Sections 120B/307/392/393 IPC) was granted, considering the length of detention under the custody, against the apprehension of prosecution that accused may abscond from the trial. 
3) In (2012) 4 SCC 134; Deepak S Mehta -Vs- CBI; bail has been granted under Section 439 CrPC, considering that where there is delay in trial, bail should not be denied. Paragraph-19 is quoted below:- 
"As observed earlier, we are conscious of the fact that the present appellant along with others are charged with economic offences of huge magnitude. At the same time, we cannot lose sight of the facts though the investigating agency has completed the investigation and submitted the charge sheet including the additional charge sheet, the fact remains that the necessary charges have not been framed. Therefore, the presence of the appellant in custody may not be necessary for further Page No.# 4/6 investigation. In view of the same, considering the health condition as supported by the documents, including the certificate of the medical officer, we are of the view that the appellant is entitled to an order of bail, pending trial on stringent conditions, in order to safeguard the interest of CBI." 
4) In 2012 (3) Supreme 270; Shiv Mohan Kapoor -Vs State of UP, bail has been granted under Section 439 CrPC, where the co-accused has already been granted bail. 
5) In 2018 (0) Supreme (SC) 1267; Omprakash @ Manta -Vs- State of MP, the Court granted bail after conviction on parity, where the sentence of other co-accused persons had been suspended. 
6) In (2018) 14 SCC 493; Sharad T Kabra -Vs- Union of India (in an offence under Section 120 (B)/420/467/468/471 IPC and Prevention of Money Laundering Act), bail was granted under Section 439 CrPC, holding that though the charge sheet has been submitted but the trial has not commenced and even the charges have not been framed against the accused and such release on bail should be on requisite conditions, as may be considered appropriate. 
10. This Court in (2018) 0 Supreme (Gau) 1044, Utpal Bhuyan -Vs- State of Assam, (in an offence under Sections 120 (B)/201/420/463/468/471 IPC, read with Section 13 (1) (a) (b), 13 (1) (d), 13 (2) of the PC Act) granted bail under Section 439 CrPC, in cases relating to APSC scam on the ground of parity, as the co-accused on the same footing has already been enlarged on bail by this Court. 
11. Placing reliance upon the above decisions and referring to the matters in hand, it has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the accused person is a 60-years-old man and is suffering from various ailments and undergoing treatment since 2016 onwards till date in various hospitals (vide Annexure- Q series) for the ailments, like inflammatory lump over right sole and calonic polyp syndrome and operated on 27.11.2017, at Indraprastha Apollo Hospital at New Delhi, further treatment at Fortis Memorial, Gurgaon, for pancreatis, multiple chronic polyps on 01.06.2016, at International Hospital, Guwahati, treated for acute pancreatic, Type-II Diabetes Mellitus, Systemic Hypertension, Grade-II BEP, Hyperuricaemia (as on 06.05.2016) and also other numerous documents annexed, that he was treated at other hospitals also for his various ailments. 
12. Further, bail has been sought for on the ground of parity as while remaining all other co- accused(s) have already been enlarged on bail and trial has not yet begun. The accused has already given an undertaking before this Court to cooperate with the trial and there is no apprehension of Page No.# 5/6 hampering the investigation and tampering the witnesses, as the investigation has already been completed and charge sheet has also been laid. 
13. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Mr N K Kalita, has, however, raised objection against the bail prayer pointing towards earlier conduct of accused as he absconded immediately after filing of the FIR and one cannot claim bail only on the ground of parity and otherwise, nature and gravity of the offence cannot be denied. It is submitted that the trial of the case will be started soon after the prosecution sanction, obtained against one of the accused, Chohan Doley. 
14. Due consideration has been given to the rival submissions of both the parties and also gone through the matters on record and the decisions referred above. The LCR as well as the status report is perused, which indicates that the charge sheet has already been submitted, but cognizance has not yet been taken for want of prosecution sanction in respect of one of the accused, which has to be granted by the Central Government, and the same is awaited. As many as four accused persons have been charge sheeted, including the present petitioner and all of the accused are similarly situated. Apart from accused No. 4, Priyanghu Bairagi, proprietor of M/s Purbashree Printing House, all other accused are the officials of ABOCWWB. The other accused person, Chohan Doley was granted bail after 6 months of his custody (with stringent conditions), considering his length of detention as well as the fact that investigation has already been completed and cognizance could not be taken for want of prosecution sanction and as the entire matter is based on documentary evidence, which has already been seized and release of accused will not hamper the case. The accused Priyangshu Bairagi was granted the default bail as the charge sheet was filed much after the statutory period. Accused N. N. Choudhury was granted bail by the learned trial Court on the similar observation that cognizance could not be taken for want of prosecution sanction, despite long detention of the accused. 
15. The present accused person is also similarly situated with other co-accused. Rather he is in long detention, in comparison to other accused persons. Although the present accused was arrested much later than the other accused, but it reveals that he will complete one year detention in the last part of this month and yet there is no immediate prospect of commencement of the trial, in view of the status report received from the trial Court. All other co-accused persons are on bail, particularly on the ground of length of detention, even after filing of the charge sheet, no cognizance, no charge. 
16. Even though the offence relates to economic offence, having magnitude, but a litigant has the right to speedy trial under the Constitution. The accused herein being aged 60+ years, with multiple ailments, should not be denied the privilege of bail, in the light of observation/decision rendered by the Page No.# 6/6 Hon'ble Apex Court, despite the magnitude of such economic offence, apart from the ground of parity. He should be allowed to face the trial regularly. On the other hand, the cognizance of offence has not yet been taken and the trial is far away. 
17. Considering all entirety, this Court is of the opinion that accused Gautam Baruwa should be enlarged on bail, with strict conditions. 
18 Resultantly the accused person named above is hereby allowed to go on bail of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousands) only with two solvent sureties of like amount, with the following directions: 
i) Not to leave the jurisdiction of the learned trial Court, without permission; 
ii) He will deposit his passport to the learned trial Court, at the time of furnishing the bail bond; 
iii) He will attend the trial regularly, without hampering the trial. 
19. With the above observations and directions, the bail petition stands disposed of. 

       

Section 436 Bail in Bailable offences

Section 436 – In what cases bail to be taken
(1) When any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail:
Provided that such officer or Court, if he or it thinks fit, may, [may, and shall, if such person is indigent and is unable to furnish surety, instead of taking bail] from such person, discharge him on his executing a bond without sureties for his appearance as hereinafter provided:
Provided further that nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 116 or section 446-A
[ Explanation .–Where a person is unable to give bail within a week of the date of his arrest, it shall be a sufficient ground for the officer or the Court to presume that he is an indigent person for the purposes of this proviso.]
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub- section (1), where a person has failed to comply with the conditions of the bail-bond as regards the time and place of attendance, the Court may refuse to release him on bail, when on a subsequent occasion in the same case he appears before the Court or is brought in custody and any such refusal shall be without prejudice to the powers of the Court to call upon any person bound by such bond to pay the penalty thereof under section 446.

Section 436 crpc provides for the bail in bailable offences, it casts a duty upon the police officer as well as the court to release the accused on bail in bailable offence when the accused is ready and prepared to furnish bail.

examples of Bailable offences Simple Hurt (Section 337; IPC), Bribery (Section 171E; IPC), Public Nuisance (Section 290; IPC), Death by Rash or Negligent Act (Section 304A; IPC) etc. in Indian penal code

This provision has been inserted with a view that a person who absconds or has broken the condition of his bail bond when he was released on bail in a bailable case on a previous occasion, shall not be entitled to bail when brought to Court on any subsequent date even though the offence may be bailable.

Scope of Default Bail under section 167 CrPC

Section 167 provides for the concept of default bail. it is a section which is based on the fundamental right to life and liberty as provided in the constitution of India.

It provides for the release of the accused from jail when the accused is ready and actually furnishes bail in the condition wherein the investigation agency does not file the chargesheet within 60 or 90 days after the arrest of the accused.

It must be noted that this section is applicable on at pre cognizance stage. This stage comes to an end as soon as the chargesheet is filed by the IO.

The grant of bail under section 167(2) Crpc is not on the merits of the cae but primarily a statutory and technical right of the accused which accrues in the vent of delay in completion of the investigation by the police.

The Hon’ble supreme court in Hussainara Khatoon Vs State of Bihar 1979 has held that it is the duty of the magistrate to inform the accused that he has a right to be released on bail under this section and if the accused is prepared to furnish bail and does furnish bail as ordered, he has to be released.

The kerala high court in State of kerala vs Sadanandan 1984 has held that the court is no clog on investigation and prosecution is no lever for humiliation. freedom of individual is not licence to commit crime; personal liberty can have no conflict with the public interest. It is the duty of the court to strike a balance.

Hence the court is duty bound to release the accused on bail when there is a default on the part of the IO in filling the chargesheet within the period of 60/90 days as the case may.

Arrest- Meaning?

The word arrest has neither been defined in the code of criminal procedure (Crpc) nor in the I or any other law which deals with criminal offences in India. Section 41 crPC onward provides for the powers of arrest as to who can arrest and whom can be arrested.

It only indicates as to what would constitute arrest is found in section 46 CrPC. In order to arrest a person, the police officer has to touch or confine the body of the person to be arrested unless there is submission to the custody by words or action.

The question as to whether the police is bound to arrest a person has been answered by the the punjab and haraya High court that a police officer is not always bound to arrest an accused even if the allegation against him is having committed cognizable offence.

In gist Arrest means a person in custody and the police is entitled to restrain him. But keep in mind that the custody and arrest are two different terms it means that in every arrest there is custody but not vice versa.

After arrest there are provisions of bail which we shall discuss in upcoming days.