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Bail granted in serious fraud investigation matter

The Hon’ble High court of Delhi granted regular bail in SFIO(serious fraud investigation) matter

READ ORDER BELOW

HIGH COURT OF DELHI
ADITYA KUMAR BHANDARI V/S SERIOUS FRAUD INVESTIGATION OFFICE

Hon’ble Judges: Suresh Kumar Kait Case Type: Bail Application IN Case No: 639 of 2020

Judgement Text:-
Suresh Kumar Kait, J
[1] The present petition is filed seeking the indulgence of this Court for enlargement of the petitioner on bail in Reg. No.CC/149/2020.
[2] The case of petitioner is that RHL was established on 04.08.2004. The eldest brother of Srivastava Family namely, Late Rajesh Srivastava was the ‘Founder Chairman and Managing Director’ of Rockland Hospitals Limited (hereinafter referred to as “RHL’) and was solely managing the day-to-day affairs of RHL till the date of his demise i.e. 25.01.2016 and thereafter the same were handled by his younger brother namely Prabhat Kumar Srivastava till 30.06.2016. The Rockland Group was managed by Late Rajesh Srivastava and his family. The petitioner was a close friend of Srivastavas and was given employment by Late Rajesh Srivastava on this account. After 30.06.2016, RHL was taken over by VPS Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. and on the wishes and directions of Late Mr. Rajesh Srivastava, the Applicant, was designated on paper as a Director of RHL and some other group companies. But since this was primarily an honorary position given to the petitioner, on account of his continued years of service he was never involved in the day-to-day affairs of the said companies and his Share Holding was negligible. The petitioner was never a Guarantor of the Loans obtained by RHL.
[3] The above said position of facts is squarely admitted by Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO) inasmuch as the SFIO itself admits that even though the petitioner was a whole time Director of RHL/A1, he was not a signatory to the Financial Statements of RHL/Al (Page no.34 of the I.O. Report). Further, the petitioner has been found NOT GUILTY of the alleged offence under Sections 129, 134 and 448 of Companies Act, 2013 in respect of alleged ‘False Statement in the Balance Sheets of RHL’ as per finding No.2 at Page No. 8 of complaint. In this regard, as per Section 134(1) Companies Act, 2013 the Balance Sheet of the company is required to be approved by the Board of Directors, meaning thereby that the SFIO admits that despite being a Director in the Board of RHL, the petitioner was not functioning as a decision making member of the Board of Directors and therefore he has admittedly not been held liable for alleged falsification of the balance sheets of the RHL.
[4] After the demise of Rajesh Srivastava (Founder Chairman and Managing Director of RHL), Prabhat Srivastava obtained a P.O.A from the petitioner in relation to sale of Shares of RHL in his personal capacity and also in the name of Aditya Medicose Private Limited. This fact also establishes that the petitioner was only an inconsequential paper director since this was primarily an honorary position given to the petitioner on account of his continued years of service and negligible shareholder.
[5] Mr.Rakesh Khanna and Mr.Vikas Pahwa, learned Senior Advocates appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that each and every director is not liable in criminal proceedings for the act of other director/offence committed. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Pooja Ravinder Devidasini vs. State of Maharastra & Anr. SLP No. 9133-39 of 2010 has held as under:
“…Simply because a person is a Director of a Company, does not make him liable… Every person connected with the Company will not fall into the ambit of the provision… A Director, who was not in charge of and was not responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company at the relevant time, will not be liable for an offence …In National Small Industries Corporation (supra) this Court observed… A company may have a number of Directors and to make any or all the Directors as accused in a complaint merely on the basis of a statement that they are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company without anything more is not a sufficient or adequate fulfilment of the requirements…”
[6] Further submitted that the petitioner is aware about the total consideration for purchase of 100% Shares of RHL considered by VPS Healthcare for Rs.650 crores and from the said Sale Consideration, a sum of Rs.430 Crores was paid off to the Banks in complete discharge of loans. The same is evident from the NOC dated 24.04.2017 issued by Lead Bank. Moreover, there is no complaint alleging cheating or misappropriation of their funds made against the petitioner by any Bank or financial institution, till date. In addition, all the banks and lenders of RHL that existed before the sale of the Company to VPS Healthcare had been duly paid back and no shareholder, creditor or lender has ever raised any complaints about any alleged siphoning off of funds. Moreover, VPS Healthcare owned RHL obtained fresh bank loan of Rs.400 crores from Federal Bank for running of the operations of the Company vide Sanction Letter dated 04.01.2017. However, petitioner is in no manner related to the said fresh bank loan, as he was neither the Borrower nor the Guarantor of the said new loan obtained by VPS Healthcare.
[7] Learned senior counsels further submitted that pursuant to the takeover of RHL by VPS Healthcare, various disputes arose between the parties and the same led to:
i. Passing of Order dated 20.01.2017 by this Court restraining the Srivastava Family and their agents including the petitioner from entering the premises of RHL, copy whereof is annexed with the petition as Annexure- 5.

ii. Passing of Direction under Section 156(3) for registration of an FIR against VPS Healthcare wherein one of the allegations was that VPS Healthcare has manipulated the records of RHL in order to lodge false complaints against its erstwhile Directors, copy of Order dated 23.08.2017 passed by Ld. M.M under section 156(3) is annexed with the petition as Annexure- 6.
iii. Complaint dated 07.11.2017 and 16.12.2017 to Registrar of Companies, filed by VPS led RHL in a bid to exert undue pressure on the erstwhile promoters of RHL, which were marked to S.F.I.O for investigation vide communication dated 31.05.2018 of the M.C.A., copy whereof is annexed with the petition as Annexure-7 (Colly).
[8] Subsequently, in the above said Complaint Case No.8519/2017 filed by Prabhat Kumar Srivastava, vide order dated 23.08.2017, directions for registration of a FIR against the functionaries of VPS HealthCare led RHL were passed by the Ld. M.M. Consequently, FIR No.81/2017 has been registered.
[9] Thereafter, on 02.02.2019, after lengthy trial of more than one and half years, examination and cross examination of all parties before Arbitral Tribunal comprising of the Ex-Chief Justice of India Mr. Justice T.S. Thakur and retired Judge of Supreme Court Mr. Aftab Alam, the disputes in relation to the accounts of RHL were resolved by the parties vide award dated 01.03.2019 wherein VPS Healthcare even paid settlement amount to the representatives of the shareholders of RHL in turn for the closure of disputes between them and undertook to withdraw all their complaints. In compliance of the same, VPS Healthcare moved a letter dated 28.03.2019 before the Registrar of Companies, Delhi requesting that all complaints filed by them be treated as withdrawn and proceedings be closed/dropped.

[10] However, pursuant to the investigation, petitioner was summoned on 17.01.2019, 26.11.2019, 29.11.2019 and 02.12.2019 to appear before the SFIO. Accordingly, he has complied with every summon and joined investigation as and when called by the investigating authorities. Further, on 02.12.2019, in response to a telephonic summon by the Respondent, petitioner appeared for questioning. However, even despite full assistance and cooperation given by him to the investigation, he was arrested at 8.00 pm. Thereafter, on 31.01.2019, the Investigation Report was filed before the Ld. Special Judge under Section 173 Cr.P.C. Pursuant to this, an application under Section 437 of the Cr.P.C. seeking the petitioner’s enlargement on regular bail was filed on 11.02.2020, however, vide order dated 02.03.2020, the Ld. Special Judge dismissed the same.
[11] Learned Senior Counsels argued that it is not a case where any public funds/ public interest is involved and that till date there has not been a single complainant or victim in the present case. Inasmuch as all the loans obtained by RHL, during the period the petitioner was its whole time Director, have been paid back in full. However, the allegation of the SFIO that even though the banks have been paid, at the time of disbursal of the loan, the banks were “deceived” on account of presentation of window-dressed accounts before the banks. The said fact falls flat on its face inasmuch as despite notice of the present case by SFIO, none of the banks have stated that they were deceived in any manner, hence, the alleged offences of S 36 (c) read with Section 447, 448 of the Companies Act, 2013 are prima facie not made out. Admittedly, the petitioner was neither the Borrower nor the Guarantor of the loan obtained by RHL.
[12] Further argued that no parallels can be drawn between the present case and the case of SFIO vs. Nitin Johri & Ors.,MANU/SC/1246/2019 as relied upon the Respondent since in the case of Nitin Johri, a staggering amount of about Rs.47,000 crores has been looted from the Banks and still remains unpaid whereas in the present case, an amount of Rs.430 crores has been taken on loan from the banks and has been repaid as far back as 1 ½ years before start of the investigation. However, the Ld. Special Judge has erroneously noted that the allegations against the accused are “prima facie were found to be supported by material in the form of documents and statements of witnesses”. It is submitted that there is not even a single document/e-mail communication on record to show that the petitioner was involved in the preparation of any alleged false implant bills. However, only the statements of two witnesses mention the name of the petitioner, one of whom is himself Accused No.9 and the other witness is an ex-employee (Ravinder Sharma) who himself is alleged to have prepared fake expenditure bills but he has not been made an accused. Therefore, these two solitary statements cannot be relied upon to reject the petitioner’s bail as the said two statements are also hopelessly un-corroborated with any material on record. However, the Ld. Special Court has failed to consider that even as per the Charge Sheet, against the alleged siphoned-off amount via alleged fake expenditure bills of Rs.76.03 crore, a class of patients namely Doctor Referred Patients (DRP) which have been alleged to be non-existent have deposited a total sum of Rs. 145.59 crores in RHL and the said amount has been used for the business of the company and not for any fraudulent purpose. Hence, the amount of money flowing in RHL is far more than the alleged siphoned-off amount.

[13] Learned senior counsels argued that the present proceedings originated from Complaints dated 07.11.2017 and 16.12.2017 filed by VPS Healthcare alleging siphoning of funds from RHL, have already been withdrawn vide Letters dated 28.03.2019. But the SFIO’s allegations that the present enquiry had been initiated on the basis of the report dated 19.02.2018 under Section 143(12), Companies Act, 2013 of the Auditor of VPS Healthcare led RHL (which was at logger heads with the petitioner at that time) is also not prima facie reliable inasmuch as the said Report issued by the Auditor is counter blast to the abovesaid FIR No.81/2017 dated 24.08.2017 lodged by the petitioner against VPS led RHL and the said Auditor on account of various facts such as preparation of balance sheet of RHL within a period of one day and manipulation of accounts/ financial statements. The SFIO’s allegation that the abovesaid report of the Auditor was thereafter considered by the ROC and Report dated 19.02.2018 under section 208 of the Companies Act, 2013 was issued by ROC whereby also falls flat as the said report did not recommend inquiry by SFIO.
[14] Further argued that SFIO has no jurisdiction to investigate the present matter since none of the pre-requisites that confer such jurisdiction upon the SFIO, exist in terms of Section 212 (a) (b) and (c). The petitioner was not arrested for almost 1 ½ years during investigation, which means that even the SFIO felt that there was no apprehension that he would abscond or hamper the investigation in any manner. The petitioner has been languishing in Judicial Custody for the past more than 92 Days and Charge Sheet/Complaint has also been filed. However, during the term of J.C., the petitioner was only made to join investigation at one instance, clearly demonstrating that he is not required for any investigation. Even assuming that the only apprehension qua the petitioner was that he might influence witness, however, now, since Charge Sheet/Complaint has been filed, the said apprehension of SFIO also cannot be said to be valid ground for him to continue in judicial custody. Therefore, bail should not be withheld as a punishment as observed in the case of Nagendra vs. King Emperor, 1924 AIR(Cal) 476. Moreover, since RHL, which is A-1 company has already been sold to VPS Healthcare Limited, there is no chance or possibility that the petitioner shall commit any similar offence while on bail.

[15] It is argued on behalf of the petitioner that he is a sick person aged 58 years, whose health is extremely fragile. He had been a chronic patient of Severely High Level of Diabetes and Blood Pressure. He had, therefore, undergone ‘Laparoscopic Sleeve Gastrectomy Surgery’ on 16.01.2015, Medical Record in this regard is Annexure-12 in the petition. Post surgery, a sterile and specific diet is required to be consumed by the petitioner and in ease of non-availability of the same, the petitioner is exposed to an imminent threat of cancer.
[16] Further argued that since the day of his arrest, due to non-availability of prescribed diet, the petitioner has lost 10.50 Kg of weight during custody, which, considering his medical condition and age, is an alarmingly high level of weight loss and his medical condition has severely deteriorated on this count also.
[17] In this regard, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dipak Shubhashchandra Mehta v. CBI, 2012 4 SCC 134 has observed that “we are conscious of the fact that the present appellant along with others is charged with economic offences of huge magnitude. At the same time, we cannot lose sight of the fact that though the investigating agency has completed the investigation and submitted the chargesheet including additional charge-sheet…. the presence of the appellant in custody may not be necessary for further investigation. In view of the same, considering the health condition as supported by the documents including the certificate of the Medical Officer, Central Jail Dispensary, we are of the view that the appellant is entitled to an order of bail pending trial on stringent conditions in order to safeguard the interest of CBI.” (Emphasis Supplied)

[18] Though Section 212(6) of the Companies Act, 2013 provides for satisfaction of the twin conditions for grant of regular bail, the proviso to Section 212(6) of the Companies Act, 2013 itself carves out an exception in cases where the Accused is Sick and the same reads as under:
(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973…
no person accused of any offence under those sections shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless-
(i)the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release; and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail:
Provided that a person, who, is under the age of sixteen years or is a woman or is sick or infirm, may be released on bail, if the Special Court so directs.”
[19] On the other hand, Ms.Maninder Acharya, learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that based on order dated 31.05.2018 issued by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) under section 212(1)(a)(b) & (c), an investigation into the affairs of RHL which is currently functioning under the name M/s Medeor Hospital Limited was conducted by SFIO. Prior to ordering investigation, the statutory auditor of RHL for FY 2016-17 had reported fraud to the central government by submitting ADT-4 dated 20.10.2017 to central government under section 143(12) of Companies Act, 2013. Subsequently, MCA directed Registrar of Companies(ROC) Delhi to conduct an inquiry u/s 208 of the Companies Act, 2013 into the affairs of Rockland Hospitals limited vide order dated 20.11.2017. In pursuance of the above-mentioned order ROC Delhi submitted its report under section 208 of Companies Act, 2013 on 19.02.2018 recommending investigation. Thereafter, the MCA, in exercise of its powers under Sections 212(1)(a), (b) & (c) and 219 of the Companies Act, 2013 vide Orders dated 31.05.2018 & 30.09.2019, assigned investigation into the affairs of Rockland Hospitals Ltd. (Now M/s. Medeor Hospital Ltd) and four other companies to SFIO. Accordingly, SFIO conducted investigation into the affairs of Rockland Hospitals Ltd. and four other companies and an investigation report was submitted on 24.01.2020 to MCA and MCA, vide its Letter No. Legal-35/1/2020 dated 30.01.2020 issued necessary directions to the SFIO to file and initiate prosecution against the accused persons. Accordingly, a Criminal Complaint bearing No. 149/2020 was filed before Ld. Special Judge (Companies Act), Dwarka District Courts, Delhi on 31.01.2020 and vide order dated 29.02.2020, the Ld. Special Judge was pleased to take cognizance of all the offences brought out in the Criminal Complaint against all accused persons.

[20] Ms.Acharya further submitted that during investigation two persons Prabhat Kumar Srivastava & Aditya Kumar Bhandari (petitioner herein) the erstwhile promoter-cum-Managing Director & promoter-cum-whole time Director were arrested under section 212(8) of Companies Act, 2013 on 02.12.2019. The investigation report dated 24.01.2020 had brought six (6) separate instances of fraud punishable under section 447 of Companies Act, 2013 against various persons. In five (5) of the six (6) instances the petitioner has been made an accused. Further, he has also been made an accused for violation of section 36(c) of Companies Act, 2013 which is also punishable under section 447 of Companies Act, 2013.
[21] Further submitted that Rockland Hospitals Limited (RHL) was a company incorporated in the year 2004. It was incorporated with the objective of carrying out the business of establishing and operating Hospitals. RHL had managed three (3) Hospitals, one at Qutub, Dwarka and Manesar. While the operations of hospital at Qutub was taken over by RHL in the FY 2008-09, hospital at Dwarka was made operational in the year 2011 and the hospital at Manesar started its operation in the year 2013. Accordingly, 100% shareholding of RHL was transferred by the shareholders i.e. promoters of RHL in the FY 2016-17 to VPS Health Care Private Limited for a consideration of Rs.165 Crores. The promoters including petitioner have committed inter-alia frauds by various manners:
I. Rockland Hospitals (Qutub) started its commercial operations from 2003-04 and was operated and managed by a trust Foundation of Applied Research in Cancer (FARC), the management and operations were transferred from FARC to RHL from 2008-09 onwards. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) directed RHL to deposit a sum of Rs. 13.21 Crores towards additional Floor Aspect Ratio (FAR) charges for the expansion of Hospital at Qutub Premises. Payment to MCD was made by RHL on 16.08.2011 by obtaining a special term loan of Rs. 13.22 Crore from the Union Bank of India. This loan was repaid in monthly instalments (EMI) by RHL. Subsequently, after various litigations, in compliance to order dated 14.01.2015 passed by this Court, MCD had made a refund of Rs.13.17 Crore paid towards additional FAR to the account of FARC on 26.03.2015. Since the amount was originally paid by RHL, the amount repaid by MCD ought to have been brought into the Profits and Loss Account, instead a structure was created to defraud RHL of Rs.13.17 Crore. On the same day i.e. 26.03.2015 the entire amount of Rs.13.17 Crore received from MCD was transferred to Rishi Kumar Srivastava (Trustee of FARC) in his personal Saving Bank Account No.344602010085186 and on the next day, the same amount of Rs.13.17 Crore was transferred from Rishi Kumar Srivastava to RHL and this transfer was shown as a unsecured loan advanced by Rishi Kumar Srivastava to RHL. Thus, a false facade was created to show that the amount has been transferred through Rishi Kumar Srivastava to RHL, whereas in truth RHL was burdened with an additional liability of Rs.13.17 Crore, the amount which otherwise belonged to RHL. However, RHL paid back the unsecured loan to Rishi Kumar Srivastava in the subsequent financial years. In fact, even after RHL had paid back the unsecured loan amount to Rishi Kumar Srivastava, against false liabilities created, RHL was still paying back the original loan amount (EMI) borrowed to pay MCD with interest till 17.07.2017.
II. The petitioner was one of the promoters, close associate of Srivastava’s and whole-time director of RHL between FY 2011-12 to FY 2014-15 when funds were deposited with MCD and when the refund from MCD was masqueraded and shown as unsecured loan repayable to Rishi Kumar Srivastava. He had signed the Management and Operations License Agreement (MOLA) on 14.02.2007 on behalf of RHL with FARC. He was the authorized representative of FARC in its legal matters and he filed the Writ Petition No.4195/2013 as authorized representative of FARC before this Court, seeking Refund of Rs. 13.17 Crore. He as part of the Board of Directors (BOD) approved acceptance of unsecured Loan of Rs.13.17 Crore from Rishi Kumar Srivastava on 28.03.2015. Thus, he being the whole-time director was having knowledge of accounts of RHL but, facilitated the Srivastava brothers in consummating their fraudulent scheme of siphoning off Rs. 13.17 Crore received for RHL by FARC for the undue enrichment of Rishi Kumar Srivastava.
III. RHL had maintained a Hospital Information System (HIS) wherein details of patients availing facilities/services at its hospitals were captured and these entries including patient registration, billing, discharge etc., are carried out by their respective departments. However only with respect to a category of patients called “Doctor Referred Patients (DRP)”, such entries were made by IT Team of RHL as per the instructions and knowledge of its MD Prabhat Kumar Srivastava and Group CFO Nikhil Sharma. The doctors whose names have been recorded in the HIS had stated under oath that such quantum or nature of surgeries conducted on DRP were false and fake, hence the DRP transactions were fictitious in nature and was one of the means for fudging the books of accounts. This was also substantiated by the various registers of Hospital such as OT Register, Cath Lab register maintained at the Hospitals.
IV. The petitioner was a part of audit committee of RHL in FY 2014-15 to FY 2015-16 and the audit committee is in charge of the Internal Financial Controls of the company as per section 177 of Companies Act, 2013 which include ascertaining and verifying the underlying transactions of the Revenue Source. Given that DRP formed about 40% revenue source of RHL, petitioner by act of omission to verify the revenue source had participated in the fudging of the revenue of RHL by addition of Fictitious DRP in the books of RHL.

V. The recovered email communications from RHL serves revealed that the promoters of RHL, Prabhat Kumar Srivastava, Aditya Kumar Bhandari (petitioner herein) & Nikhil Sharma (Group CFO) had directed the preparation of several implant bills. The emails revealed that RHL had routinely prepared these invoices of 3 rd parties pertaining to medical implants in a systematic manner. The emails further revealed that these invoices of 3rd parties were prepared subsequent to the date of payment of monies to these 3rd parties, which is illegal and not as per accepted business practice. The books and accounts of RHL and emails reveal that these monies were paid to 71 different accounts/entities between FY 2013-14 to FY 2015-16. The KYC documentation received from the banks also showed that these entities were majorly Sole Proprietorship & Partnerships firms. The books of accounts of the RHL and its bank statements reveal that a total amount of Rs. 76.03 Crore of RHL had been transferred as implant expenses against whom fake billings were created by RHL itself. Investigation revealed that these accounts were actually operated by accommodation entry operators, who masquerade the source and destination of funds by transferring entries through a web of parties.
VI. The petitioner as promoter and Whole Time Director of RHL during 2013-14 to FY 2015-16 had supervised the fake invoice generation by RHL as brought out in the statements of Tarun Kumar Jain Finance Manager & Ravinder Sharma, thus he had actively connived to book bogus expenses of Rs. 76.03 Crore in the Books of RHL. Further he had actually signed the banking instrument (Cheques/RTGS) etc., for siphoning the funds of RHL as authorized signatory to the Bank Accounts of RHL.
VII. During investigation, it is revealed that RHL had two major sources of funds between FY 2004-05 to FY 2015-16, which were borrowings from the Banks amounting to Rs.294.65 Crore and Share Capital Infusion of Rs.221.20 Crore. Share capital infusion brought into the books of RHL was Rs. 9.61 Crore, World Bank (IFC) had brought in Rs. 40 Crore and 21 Promoter Controlled Companies had brought in Rs. 168.38 Crore. While the net income earned by all promoters of RHL and their spouses shown in the income tax returns filed by them during the period 2005-06 to 2016-17 was Rs. 8.53 Crore only, however, they have shown to have infused share capital of Rs.179 Crores into RHL. The promoters of RHL had designed a dubious scheme whereby Rs. 168.38 Cr of share capital was brought into RHL through a web of 21 Companies controlled by them with the help of 266 accommodation entry operator-controlled companies spread across Delhi, West Bengal, Assam, Bihar, Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra, Orissa, Telangana, Tamil Nadu & Uttar Pradesh. The promoters of RHL had ultimately purchased 100% of shares of all Layer-1 Companies but without any consideration and they were unable to provide any documentary evidence for purchase of these shares from the original share subscribers or from any other party, including bank transactions and share transfer agreements. The modus operandi followed by the promoters was to transfer funds of RHL falsely as advances to Somya Constructions Private Limited (SCPL), RSH Meditech Systems Private Limited (RSH) towards capital expenditure or directly to various 3rd Parties as expenses. Subsequently SCPL or RSH (which were under the common control of the promoters) or 3rd Parties would use accommodation entry operators to layer and transfer these amounts to the 21 Layer 1 Companies, who would in turn invest the same into share capital of RHL. The accommodation entry operators follow the typical method of using various entities that they operate to layer and transfer the amounts involved from the source to the final destination, which in this case was the 21 Layer-1 companies. The above said modus operandii was followed by the promoters of RHL causing methodical falsification of books of accounts of RHL and by siphoning off the funds of RHL to only show that the promoters had infused a total share capital of Rs. 177.94 Crore into RHL, either by themselves or through 21- Layer 1 companies controlled by them. In this process the promoters had also systematically increased their ownership over RHL at the cost of its minority shareholder World Bank (IFC). The shares of RHL held by 21 Layer Companies were purchased from monies siphoned off from RHL and eventually the promoters disposed of these shares to VPS Health Care Private limited for a consideration of Rs.102.85 Crore resulting in unlawful gain to the promoters.

VIII. The petitioner as a whole time director of RHL, had overseen the dubious scheme of infusing Rs.168.38 crores share capital through a web of companies into RHL resulting in an unlawful gain to the promoters of Rs.102.85 Crore. He was also a director of Aditya Medicos Private Limited &Lipi Finstock Limited (2 of the 21 Layer-1 Companies) used by the promoters of RHL to siphon off funds of RHL and bring back the same in their own name to an extent of Rs.58.10 Crore (Rs. 5.64 Crore through Aditya Medicos Private Limited & Rs.52.46 Crore through LipiFinstock Limited). Personal gain by petitioner & his family in the above modus operandii is Rs. 5.03 Crore (Rs. 3.69 Crore in his name & Rs.1.34 Crore in his spouse name) by holding shares in Aditya Medicose Private Ltd, Mona Infotech Pvt. Ltd, Prabhat Healthcare Services Pvt Ltd, Regal Builders & Promotes Pvt. Ltd, Umesh Pharmaceuticals Pvt.Ltd, A.B. Medicos Pvt. Ltd, Vaibhav India Surgicals Pvt Ltd (7 of the 21 Layer-1 Companies).
IX. On 06.06.2008 IFC, World Bank had invested Rs.40 Crore in the equity share capital of RHL and by deceit, fraudulent conduct of business and act of omission IFC was made to sell the shares it had purchased at Rs. 40 Crore at Rs.11 Crore to Mala Srivastava on 27.06.2016 and these shares were resold to VPS Health Care Private Limited at a price of Rs.19.15 Cr on 29.06.2016 thus obtaining an unlawful gain of Rs.8.14 Cr. The purchase and resale of share of IFC was not just in violations of provisions of the share purchase agreement and share sale agreement but also against the duty cast on directors of RHL Mala Srivastava & Prabhat Kumar Srivastava who had the fiduciary duty of protecting the interest of all the shareholders as laid down in section 166 of Companies Act, 2013 which states that a director of a company shall act in good faith in order to promote the objects of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in the best interests of the company, its employees, the shareholders. However the promoters had with full knowledge of sale of share of RHL to VPS Health Care Private Limited, and had abused their position in RHL by conniving to defraud the minority shareholder(IFC), which falls squarely under the definition of fraud as it includes act of omission, concealment of any fact or abuse of position committed by the directors of the company Mala Srivastava and Prabhat Kumar Srivastava with intent to deceive, to gain undue advantage from, or to injure the interests of, its shareholders and hence were made accused under section 447 of Companies Act, 2013.
X. Investigation revealed that the promoters of RHL had created a category of false patients DRP in order to inflate the revenue of the company and amounts receivable from debtors, for instance the financial statements for FY 2015-16 disclose the total trade receivable as on 31.03.2016 as Rs. 27.13 Crores, however, month wise representation given by company signed by Prabhat Kumar Srivastava as MD of RHL, for obtaining working capital shows the value of debtors (DRP) of the company as Rs.89.87 crores to Rs.141.84 crores between June 2015 to March 2016, which is a materially false statement before the banks so as to receive additional credit.
XI. The petitioner was the promoter director of RHL and had connived with Prabhat Kumar Srivastava to systematically manipulate revenue pertaining to DRP and was on the board of directors that had authorized Prabhat Kumar Srivastava to file false statements before financial institutions on behalf of the Board of Directors of RHL for borrowing of public funds through false representation.
XII. A tabulation of all nine (9) persons accused of section 447 and section 36(c) of Companies Act, 2013 in the above said 7 instances is shown below:

S. No .
Name of Persons
Accused No.
MCD
DRP
BOGUS EXPENSES
SHARE CAPITAL
RHOL
IFC
BANKS
1.
Prabhat Kumar Srivastava
A4
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
2.
Aditya Kumar Bhandari
A6
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
3.
Rishi Kumar Srivastava
A5
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
4.
Nikhil Sharma
A7
  
Y
Y
 
 
 
 
5.
Bipin Joshi
A8
 
Y
 
 
 
 
 
6.
Tarun Kumar Jain
A9
 
 
Y
 
 
 
 
7.
Mala Srivastava
A10
 
 
 
 
 
Y
 
8.
Sandeep Narula
A11
 
Y
  
 
 
 
 
9.
Sandeep Khosla
A20
 
Y
 
 
 
 
 
[22] To strengthen her arguments, learned Additional Solicitor has relied upon the case of Serious Fraud Investigation Office vs. Nittin Johari & Ors., 2019 AIR(SC) 4380, wherein Hon’ble the Supreme Court has observed as under:
“10. It is pertinent to begin our discussion by referring to the mandatory conditions imposed under Section 212(6)(ii) for the grant of bail in connection with offences under Section 447 of the Companies Act. Sub-clause (ii) of Section 212(6) reads as follows:
“(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), offence covered under section 447 of this Act shall be cognizable and no person accused of any offence under those sections shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless-
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail” Although arguments have been advanced touching upon the scope and validity of the above provision, particularly in the aftermath of the decision of this Court in Nikesh Tarachand Shah (supra) pertaining to a similar provision in the PMLA, we do not find it appropriate to make any observations in this regard in light of the pendency of the challenge to the constitutionality of the said provision of the Companies Act before this Court.

  1. At this juncture, it must be noted that even as per Section 212(7) of the Companies Act, the limitation under Section 212(6) with respect to grant of bail is in addition to those already provided in the Cr.P.C. Thus, it is necessary to advert to the principles governing the grant of bail under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C. Specifically, heed must be paid to the stringent view taken by this Court towards grant of bail with respect of economic offences. In this regard, it is pertinent to refer to the following observations of this Court in Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy (supra):
    “34. Economic offences constitute a class apart and need to be visited with a different approach in the matter of bail. The economic offences having deep- rooted conspiracies and involving huge loss of public funds need to be viewed seriously and considered as grave offences affecting the economy of the country as a whole and thereby posing serious threat to the financial health of the country.
  1. While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public/State and other similar considerations.” This Court has adopted this position in several decisions, including Gautam Kundu v. Directorate of Enforcement (Prevention of Money Laundering Act), Government of India, 2015 16 SCC 1, and State of Bihar v. Amit Kumar, 2017 13 SCC 751. Thus, it is evident that the above factors must be taken into account while determining whether bail should be granted in cases involving grave economic offences.
  2. As already discussed supra, it is apparent that the Special Court, while considering the bail applications filed by Respondent No. 1 both prior and subsequent to the filing of the Investigation Report and complaint, has attempted to account not only for the conditions laid down in Section 212(6) of the Companies Act, but also of the general principles governing the grant of bail.
  3. In our considered opinion, the High Court in the impugned order has failed to apply even these general principles. The High Court, after referring to certain portions of the complaint to ascertain the alleged role of Respondent No. 1, came to the conclusion that the role attributed to him was merely that of colluding with the co-accused promoters in the commission of the offence in question. The Court referred to the principles governing the grant of bail as laid down by this Court in Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsingh Sharma v. State of Maharashtra, 2005 5 SCC 294, which discusses the effect of the twin mandatory conditions pertaining to the grant of bail for offences under the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 as laid down in Section 21(4) thereof, similar to the conditions embodied in Section 212(6)(ii) of the Companies Act. However, the High Court went on to grant bail to Respondent No.1 by observing that bail was justified on the “broad probabilities” of the case.
    In our considered opinion, this vague observation demonstrates non-application of mind on the part of the Court even under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C., even if we keep aside the question of satisfaction of the mandatory requirements under Section 212(6)(ii) of the Companies Act.”\

[23] She further relied upon the case of P. Chidambaram vs. Directorate of Enforcement,MANU/SSC/1670/2019, wherein Hon’ble the Supreme Court has held as under:
“21. Thus from cumulative perusal of the judgments cited on either side including the one rendered by the Constitution Bench of this Court, it could be deduced that the basic jurisprudence relating to bail remains the same inasmuch as the grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception so as to ensure that the accused has the opportunity of securing fair trial. However, while considering the same the gravity of the offence is an aspect which is required to be kept in view by the Court. The gravity for the said purpose will have to be gathered from the facts and circumstances arising in each case. Keeping in view the consequences that would befall on the society in cases of financial irregularities, it has been held that even economic offences would fall under the category of “grave offence” and in such circumstance while considering the application for bail in such matters, the Court will have to deal with the same, being sensitive to the nature of allegation made against the accused. One of the circumstances to consider the gravity of the offence is also the term of sentence that is prescribed for the offence the accused is alleged to have committed. Such consideration with regard to the gravity of offence is a factor which is in addition to the triple test or the tripod test that would be normally applied. In that regard what is also to be kept in perspective is that even if the allegation is one of grave economic offence, it is not a rule that bail should be denied in every case since there is no such bar created in the relevant enactment passed by the legislature nor does the bail jurisprudence provides so. Therefore, the underlining conclusion is that irrespective of the nature and gravity of charge, the precedent of another case alone will not be the basis for either grant or refusal of bail though it may have a bearing on principle. But ultimately the consideration will have to be on case to case basis on the facts involved therein and securing the presence of the accused to stand trial.”
[24] Learned ASG submitted that while granting bail twin test to be tested in the present case as held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court, in this case, petitioner has played active role in committing fraud, therefore, he does not deserve bail.
[25] I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the material available on record.
[26] The allegations against the petitioner are that he was one of the promoters and close associate of Srivastava’s and whole time director of RHL between financial year 2011-12 to 2014-15 when funds were deposited with MCD and when the refund from MCD was masqueraded and shown as unsecured loan repayable to Rishi Kumar Srivastava. The petitioner had signed the Management and Operations Licence Agreement (MOLA) on 14.02.2007 on behalf of RHL with FARC. He was the authorized representative of FARC in its legal matters and he filed the Writ Petition No.4195/2013 of FARC, seeking refund of Rs.13.17 crores. He as part of the Board of Directors (BoD) approved acceptance of Unsecured Loans of Rs.13.17 crores from Rishi Kumar Srivastava on 28.03.2015. Thus, petitioner being the whole time Director was having knowledge of accounts of RHL and facilitated the Srivastava brothers in consummating their fraudulent scheme of siphoning off Rs. 13.17 Crores received for RHL by FARC for the undue enrichment of Rishi Kumar Srivastava.
[27] Further allegations against the petitioner are that RHL had maintained a Hospital Information System (HIS) wherein details of patients availing facilities/services at its hospitals were captured and these entries including patient registration, billing, discharge etc., are carried out by their respective departments. However, only with respect to a category of patients called DRP, such entries were made by IT Team of RHL as per the instructions and knowledge of its MD Prabhat Kumar Srivastava and Group CFO Nikhil Sharma. However, the doctors whose names have been recorded in the HIS had stated under oath that such quantum or nature of surgeries conducted on DRP were false and fake. Hence, the DRP transactions were fictitious in nature and were one of the means for fudging the books of accounts.
[28] The above said fact has been substantiated by the records of hospital itself. Moreover, the e-mail communications gathered at the time of investigation reveal that both Prabhat Kumar Srivastava and Group CFO Nikhil Sharma had supervised/directed manipulation of the patient pertaining to DRP recorded in the system. Thus, given that DRP formed about 40% revenue source of RHL, but act of omission to verify the revenue source, petitioner had participated in fudging of the revenue of RHL by addition of fictitious DRP in the books of RHL.

[29] It is further alleged against the petitioner that as promoter and Whole Time Director of RHL during financial year 2013 to financial year 2016 had supervised the fake invoice generation by RHL as brought out in the statements of Tarun Kumar Jain, Finance Manager & Ravinder Sharma, thus, the petitioner had actively connived to book bogus expenses of Rs.76.03 Crore in the Books of RHL. Further he had actually signed the banking instrument (Cheques/RTGS) etc., for siphoning the funds of RHL as authorized signatory to the Bank Accounts of RHL.
[30] During investigation, it is revealed that RHL had two major sources of funds between FY 2004-05 to FY 2015-16, which were borrowings from the Banks amounting to Rs.294.65 Crore and Share Capital Infusion of Rs.221.20 Crore. Share capital infusion brought into the books of RHL was Rs. 9.61 Crore, World Bank (IFC) had brought in Rs. 40 Crore and 21 Promoter Controlled Companies had brought in Rs. 168.38 Crore. While the net income earned by all promoters of RHL and their spouses shown in the Income Tax Returns filed by them during the period 2005-06 to 2016-17 was Rs. 8.53 Crore only, however, they have shown to have infused share capital of Rs.179 Crores into RHL. Thus, promoters of RHL had designed a dubious scheme whereby Rs. 168.38 Crore of share capital was brought into RHL through a web of 21 Companies controlled by them with the help of 266 accommodation entry operator-controlled companies spread across the country. The promoters of RHL had ultimately purchased 100% of shares of all Layer-1 Companies but without any consideration and they were unable to provide any documentary evidence for purchase of these shares from the original share subscribers or from any other party, including bank transactions and share transfer agreements. The modus operandi followed by the promoters was to transfer funds of RHL falsely as advances to Somya Constructions Private Limited (SCPL), RSH Meditech System Private Limited (RSH) towards capital expenditure or directly to various 3rd Parties as expenses. Subsequently, SCPL or RSH or 3rd Parties would use accommodation entry operators to layer and transfer these amounts to the 21 Layer-1 Companies, who would in turn invest the same into share capital of RHL. The above said modus operandii was followed by the promoters of RHL causing methodical falsification of books of accounts of RHL and by siphoning off the funds of RHL to only show that the promoters had infused a total share capital of Rs. 177.94 Crore into RHL, either by themselves or through 21- Layer 1 companies controlled by them.
[31] In addition to above, there are other serious allegations of fraud committed by the promoters as submitted by Ms.Maninder Acharya, learned Additional Solicitor General. However, personal allegation against the petitioner is that by the whole modus-operandi the personal gain is Rs.05.03 crore (Rs.3.69 crore in his name and Rs.1.34 crore in his spouse name) by holding shares in Aditya Medicose Pvt. Ltd., Mona Infotech Pvt. Ltd., Umesh Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. Prabhat Healthcare Services Pvt. Ltd., A.B. Medicos Pvt. Ltd., Vaibhav India Surgicals Pvt. Ltd. (7 of the 21 Layer 1 companies).

[32] In my opinion, sections 210 and 212 of the Companies Act, 2013 are relevant to establish that Central Government has power to investigate into the affairs of a company, which are reproduced as under:
Section 210: Investigation into Affairs of Company: (1) Where the Central Government is of the opinion, that it is necessary to investigate into the affairs of a company,-
(a) on the receipt of a report of the Registrar or inspector under section 208;
(b) on intimation of a special resolution passed by a company that the affairs of the company ought to be investigated; or
(c) in public interest, it may order an investigation into the affairs of the company.
(2) Where an order is passed by a court or the Tribunal in any proceedings before it that the affairs of a company ought to be investigated, the Central Government shall order an investigation into the affairs of that company.
(3) For the purposes of this section, the Central Government may appoint one or more persons as inspectors to investigate into the affairs of the company and to report thereon in such manner as the Central Government may direct.”
Section 212: Investigation into affairs of Company by Serious Fraud Investigation Office: (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of section 210, where the Central Government is of the opinion, that it is necessary to investigate into the affairs of a company by the Serious Fraud Investigation Office-
(a) on receipt of a report of the Registrar or inspector under section 208;
(b) on intimation of a special resolution passed by a company that its affairs are required to be investigated;
(c) in the public interest; or
(d) on request from any Department of the Central Government or a State Government, the Central Government may, by order, assign the investigation into the affairs of the said company to the Serious Fraud Investigation Office and its Director, may designate such number of inspectors, as he may consider necessary for the purpose of such investigation.
(2) Where any case has been assigned by the Central Government to the Serious Fraud Investigation Office for investigation under this Act, no other investigating agency of Central Government or any State Government shall proceed with investigation in such case in respect of any offence under this Act and in case any such investigation has already been initiated, it shall not be proceeded further with and the concerned agency shall transfer the relevant documents and records in respect of such offences under this Act to Serious Fraud Investigation Office.
(3) Where the investigation into the affairs of a company has been assigned by the Central Government to Serious Fraud Investigation Office, it shall conduct the investigation in the manner and follow the procedure provided in this Chapter; and submit its report to the Central Government within such period as may be specified in the order.
(4) The Director, Serious Fraud Investigation Office shall cause the affairs of the company to be investigated by an Investigating Officer who shall have the power of the inspector under section 217.
(5) The company and its officers and employees, who are or have been in employment of the company shall be responsible to provide all information, explanation, documents and assistance to the Investigating Officer as he may require for conduct of the investigation.

(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the offences covered under sub-sections (5) and (6) of section 7, section 34, section 36, sub-section (1) of section 38, sub-section (5) of section 46, sub-section (7) of section 56, sub-section (10) of section 66, sub-section (5) of section 140, sub-section (4) of section 206, section 213, section 229, sub-section (1) of section 251, sub-section (3) of section 339 and section 448 which attract the punishment for fraud provided in section 447 of this Act shall be cognizable and no person accused of any offence under those sections shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless-
(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release; and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail:
Provided that a person, who, is under the age of sixteen years or is a woman or is sick or infirm, may be released on bail, if the Special Court so directs:
Provided further that the Special Court shall not take cognizance of any offence referred to this sub-section except upon a complaint in writing made by-
(i) the Director, Serious Fraud Investigation Office; or
(ii) any officer of the Central Government authorised, by a general or special order in writing in this behalf by that Government.
(7) The limitation on granting of bail specified in sub-section (6) is in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail.
(8) If the Director, Additional Director or Assistant Director of Serious Fraud Investigation Office authorised in this behalf by the Central Government by general or special order, has on the basis of material in his possession reason to believe (the reason for such belief to be recorded in writing) that any person has been guilty of any offence punishable under sections referred to in sub-section (6), he may arrest such person and shall, as soon as may be, inform him of the grounds for such arrest.
(9) The Director, Additional Director or Assistant Director of Serious Fraud Investigation Office shall, immediately after arrest of such person under sub-section (8), forward a copy of the order, along with the material in his possession, referred to in that sub-section, to the Serious Fraud Investigation Office in a sealed envelope, in such manner as may be prescribed and the Serious Fraud Investigation Office shall keep such order and material for such period as may be prescribed.
(10) Every person arrested under sub-section (8) shall within twenty-four hours, be taken to a Judicial Magistrate or a Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, having jurisdiction:

Provided that the period of twenty-four hours shall exclude the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Magistrate’s court.
(11) The Central Government if so directs, the Serious Fraud Investigation Office shall submit an interim report to the Central Government.
(12) On completion of the investigation, the Serious Fraud Investigation Office shall submit the investigation report to the Central Government.
(13) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, a copy of the investigation report may be obtained by any person concerned by making an application in this regard to the court.
(14) On receipt of the investigation report, the Central Government may, after examination of the report (and after taking such legal advice, as it may think fit), direct the Serious Fraud Investigation Office to initiate prosecution against the company and its officers or employees, who are or have been in employment of the company or any other person directly or indirectly connected with the affairs of the company.
(15) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, the investigation report filed with the Special Court for framing of charges shall be deemed to be a report filed by a police officer under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
(16) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, any investigation or other action taken or initiated by Serious Fraud Investigation Office under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 shall continue to be proceeded with under that Act as if this Act had not been passed.
(17) (a) In case Serious Fraud Investigation Office has been investigating any offence under this Act, any other investigating agency, State Government, police authority, income-tax authorities having any information or documents in respect of such offence shall provide all such information or documents available with it to the Serious Fraud Investigation Office;
(b) The Serious Fraud Investigation Office shall share any information or documents available with it, with any investigating agency, State Government, police authority or income tax authorities, which may be relevant or useful for such investigating agency, State Government, police authority or income-tax authorities in respect of any offence or matter being investigated or examined by it under any other law.”
[33] Regarding medical condition of the petitioner, as per reports dated 06.03.2020, 18.03.2020 & 17.04.2020 show that the Petitioner is a case of Diabetes with a history of Laparospic sleeve gastrectomy surgery on 16.01.2015 and is receiving all medications as prescribed and his condition is stable. In fact, attention is drawn to the following aspects of the report given by the medical officer:
a) Petitioner didn’t require any hospitalization during the judicial custody (Report dated 17.04.2020 Para b)
b) Petitioner has never been sent to hospital outside jail premises (Report dated 06.03.2020 Para 3)
c) Petitioner is getting all requisite medication (Report dated 06.03.2020 Para 4 & Report dated 17.04.2020 Para c)
d) Petitioner’s condition is stable (Report dated 06.03.2020 Para 5 & Report dated 17.04.2020 Para c).
[34] The medical opinion of the jail doctor dated 30.04.2020 on whether or not the petitioner’s susceptibility to Corona virus disease (COVID-19) is high given the fact that he is incarcerated is that “The inmate is not having any higher susceptibility of getting infected by COVID 19 due to incarceration in the jail environment. However, as per the prevailing conditions and general outcome it has been noted that the patients with diabetes, hypertension, heart disease etc. tend to have increased tendency to develop serious COVID 19 disease.”
[35] The medical opinion of the jail doctors dated 30.04.2020 on the issue of his weight loss points out that:
a) The Petitioners weight was completely stable at 78 Kgs since 17.02.2020 to 29.04.2020. The opinion also states that the inmate has maintained the same weight for the last 2 months and necessary treatment was provided to him.
b) The petitioner when taken into custody was 90 Kgs and had lost weight in the initial phase of custody due to reduced capacity of the stomach which leads to reduced intake of food, in addition some inmates also tend to lose weight in the initial phase of jail incarceration due to stress and change in diet.
c) Routine investigations were within normal limits.
[36] Thus, the medical report shows that the susceptibility of the petitioner to COVID 19 due to incarceration is not higher and further the contention of the petitioner that he had lost 13 kgs in the last 3 months is false, rather his weight had been constant at 78 Kgs for the last 73 days which is within the normal limits (between 17.02.2020 to 29.04.2020). Further, considering that the petitioner is being given all required medical treatment by the Jail Authorities and that his condition is stable from the last two months, it is established that the petitioner is not having any higher susceptibility of getting infected by COVID 19 due to incarceration in the jail environment.
[37] Also considering that the height of the petitioner is around 6 feet and his present weight is 78kgs, the Body Mass Index (BMI) of the petitioner is 23.5 Kg/M Sq. Given that the healthy/normal BMI range prescribed by WHO is between 18.5 Kg/M Sq. to 25 Kg/M Sq., by no stretch of imagination can the petitioner be termed as underweight. In fact, the ideal weight range for the petitioners height is between 62 & 82 Kgs.
[38] In view of above, I am of the considered opinion that there are no medical grounds available to the petitioner for grant of bail.

[39] It is pertinent to mention here that vide order dated 20.04.2020 while disposing of the Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.5825/2020 and thereby allowing urgent hearing of present bail application (through video conferencing) directed the respondent to file the status report in the matter under consideration more specifically, showing the difference between the role of the petitioner herein against that of accused nos.5, 7 to 11 and 20. As per the above tabulation of 9 accused, they all are booked under section 447 and section 36(c) of Companies Act, 2013 in the 7 instances of Fraud as per status report. However, on perusal of said table, role of petitioner and role of Rishi Kumar Srivastava (A-5) is same. But A-5 has not been arrested and chargesheet has already been filed. However, there is no explanation to this effect. As per the table, role of accused nos.7 to 11 & 20 are very less, therefore, there is justification on not arresting them.
[40] It is pertinent to mention here that in respect of Finding No.1- Instance VI, the petitioner has not been arraigned as an accused. However, in respect of Finding No. 2 and 3, the SFIO itself has found the petitioner NOT GUILTY of the alleged offence under Sections 129, 134 and 448 of Companies Act, 2013 in respect of alleged ‘False Statement in the Balance Sheets of RHL’, despite the fact that the petitioner was a Director of RHL for the relevant period (Finding No. 2 at page No. 8 of the Complaint), he cannot in any manner be accused of Section 36 (C) of the Companies’ Act, 2013 i.e. allegedly having represented any False Financial Statement/Information to the Banks in as much as admittedly he had no role in the preparation of the said Financial Statements.
[41] Be that it as may, in any case, admittedly, the petitioner had no role to play with the banks inasmuch as the petitioner was not a guarantor to any bank loan of RHL. In any case, the banks have not filed any complaint with regard to having been deceived, rather, admittedly, the entire outstanding of the bank has been cleared.
[42] In respect of Finding Nos. 4 to 9, the same are bailable and hence the same are not required to be considered for the adjudication of the present bail application at this juncture.
[43] After going through the status report and considering the arguments advanced by learned Additional Solicitor General, Ms.Maninder Acharya, the main beneficiary of all the 7 instances of fraud is Prabhat Kumar Srivastava and his family. The petitioner herein has received peanuts through interest in shares. All directors and promoters are equally liable, therefore, cannot be different parameter for petitioner and other promoters.
[44] In the case of Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy vs. CBI, 2013 7 SCC 439, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that “while granting bail, the Court has to keep in mind the factors like the nature of accusation, evidence in support thereof, the severity of punishment which conviction will entail, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused during trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tempered with, the large interests of the public/state and other similar considerations.”
[45] It is pertinent to mention here that SFIO itself admits that even though the petitioner was a whole time Director of RHL/A-1, he was not signatory to the Financial Statements of said company. Further, petitioner has been found NOT GUILTY of the alleged offence under sections 129, 134 and 448 of Companies Act, 2013 in respect of alleged “False Statement in the Balance Sheet of RHL as per finding No.2 at page 8 of complaint.’
[46] Admittedly, there is no loss caused either to any financial institution or Central/State Government. Moreover, there is no complaint from any share holders. Whereas, in case of Nittin Johary (supra,) huge loss has been caused to the Banks, shareholders and other stake holders. Moreover, in the present case under section 447 the Companies Act, if fraud is proved, the accused shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend upto ten years and fine not less than the amount involved. Thus the judgments relied upon by the respondent are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case as petitioner is concerned.
[47] It is not in dispute that investigation is complete, criminal complaint has been filed and charges are yet to be framed. Presently, our country is under “Lock-down’ due to COVID-19, therefore, regular functioning of the courts may take more time. Thus, in the present situation, trial of the present case is not possible in the near future. Further, there is no allegations that petitioner is flight risk or may temper with the evidence or influence the witnesses.
[48] Since present application is for bail, therefore, this Court refrains from making any observation on the merit of the prosecution case, which is subject matter of the Trial. However, in view of above facts and considering the period in judicial custody, this Court is of the view that petitioner deserves for bail.
[49] Accordingly, he shall be released on bail subject to his furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs.50,000/- before the concerned Jail Superintendent and a surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of Trial Court as and when, the Court starts its regular functioning.
[50] He shall not leave the country without permission of the Trial Court.
[51] The Trial Court shall not get influenced by the observation made by this Court while passing the order.
[52] In view of above, present bail application is allowed and disposed of.
[53] Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.
[54] Copy of this order be transmitted to learned counsel for the parties through e-mail.
[55] A copy of the same shall also be sent to the Jail Superintendent concerned and Trial Court for compliance.

The article is being written by Advocate Vikas Nagwan

Court has to decide bail application

Whenever an accused appears before the court or is brought before the court, he/she has the option to apply for bail. In such cases when the bail application is filed, the court has to first ascertain whether the offence the person is accused of, is bailable or  non bailable. In bailable offence or bailable cases, the accused can get the bail from police station itself as per the mandate of section 436 CrPC if the accused is ready to furnish bail and furnishes bail.  In cases of non bailable offences the grant of bail is a discretion of the court.

In State versus Captain Joginder Singh 1961 Supreme court ash observed that “Whenever an application for bail is made to a court, the first question that it has to decide is whether the, offence, for which the accused is being prosecuted is bailable or otherwise. If the offence, is bailable, hail will be granted, under s. 496 of the Code of Criminal Procedure without more ado ; but if the offence is not bailable, further considerations will arise and the court will decide the question of grant of bail in the light of those further considerations.”

Section 436 provides for the bail in bailable offences whereas section 437 CrPC provides for bail in non bailable offences. In such cases the court shall adhere to the principles provided under section 437 CrPC.

In non bailable offences, the Magistrate may release the accused under section 437 CrPC whereas the Court of session or the Hon’ble High court may release the applicant under section 439 CrPC.

Bail granted in Corruption case

Gauhati High court recently has granted bail in a corruption case in the matter of Gautam Baruwa versus The state of assam 2021 wherein the accused was arrested an has prayed for granting him regular bail, in connection with CM’s Special Vigilance Cell Police Station Case No. 9/2017, under Sections 120(B)/406/409/468/471/420 IPC, read with Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 which involves a cumulative amount of Rs. 121 crores.

The Hon’ble high court also quoted the decision of the apex court in Deepak S Mehta -Vs- CBI; wherein the bail has been granted under Section 439 CrPC, considering that where there is delay in trial, bail should not be denied. Paragraph-19 is quoted below:-
“As observed earlier, we are conscious of the fact that the present appellant along with others are charged with economic offences of huge magnitude. At the same time, we cannot lose sight of the facts though the investigating agency has completed the investigation and submitted the charge sheet including the additional charge sheet, the fact remains that the necessary charges have not been framed. Therefore, the presence of the appellant in custody may not be necessary for further investigation. In view of the same, considering the health condition as supported by the documents, including the certificate of the medical officer, we are of the view that the appellant is entitled to an order of bail, pending trial on stringent conditions, in order to safeguard the interest of CBI.

Bail in cases of non bailable offences is a discretion of the court as per the various decisions of the Hon’ble court the punishment starts after conviction.

Read full judgement below:
Gauhati High Court
Gautam Baruwa vs The State Of Assam on 8 February, 2021
                                                                                    Page No.# 1/6

GAHC010175182020




                               THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
     (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)

                                 Case No. : Bail Appln./2718/2020

             GAUTAM BARUWA
             S/O LT KSHIRODA KANTA BARUWA, R/O FLAT NO. F-4, CHANDRALAYA
             APARTMENT, LAMB ROAD,AMBARI, P.S. LATASIL GUWAHATI-781001,
             DIST. KAMRUP (M), ASSAM



             VERSUS

             THE STATE OF ASSAM
             REP. BY THE PP, ASSAM



Advocate for the Petitioner    : MR. A CHAUDHURY

Advocate for the Respondent : PP, ASSAM


                                              BEFORE
                     HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE RUMI KUMARI PHUKAN
                                      ORDER
08.02.2021 By this application under Section 439 CrPC, petitioner, namely, Sri Gautam Baruwa, who was arrested on 25.02.2020, has prayed for granting him regular bail, in connection with CM's Special Vigilance Cell Police Station Case No. 9/2017, under Sections 120(B)/406/409/468/471/420 IPC, read with Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 
2. Heard Mr A Choudhury, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr N K Kalita, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State of Assam. 
Page No.# 2/6 
3. The LCR, along with the status report submitted by the learned Presiding Officer has been produced. 
4. Pursuant to an allegation received from the erstwhile Labour Commissioner, Tapan Chandra Sarma, to the effect that during the years 2013-2016, the then Labour Commissioner -cum- Member Secretary and the Chairman and other staff of Assam Building and Other Construction Workers Welfare Board (in short, "ABOCWWB"), Guwahati, illegally incurred huge expenditure in printing leaflets, folders and booklets for awareness campaign and also printing of forms and registers without receiving indent from the Field Officers, violating the prescribed limits, an enquiry was conducted by the Inspector of Police, CM's Vigilance Cell and on the basis of self conducted enquiry by Inspector, Mrinal Sarma, the FIR was lodged, alleging that the FIR named accused persons were involved in printing of various forms and other items for three successive years, in the name of publicity of campaign for labour awareness, which involves a cumulative amount of Rs. 121 crores, while disbursing the work to the particular firms, large scale collusion is alleged to have been indulged into, in the form of manipulation of floating tenders in inflated rates and thereby, causing wrongful loss to the State exchequer and wrongful gain to the accused persons. The aforesaid FIR was registered as SVC Case No. 9/2017, under Sections 120(B)/406/409/468/471/420 IPC, read with Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, against- 1) Chohan Doley, IAS, the then Labour Commissioner 
-cum- Member Secretary, 2) Gautam Baruwa, the Chairman of ABOCWWB, 3) N N Choudhury, Administrative Officer of the Board, 4) Priyanshu Bairagi, Proprietor of Purbashree Printing House, Patacharkuchi, 5) Officials of Sarba Siksha Abhijan Mission, Assam. 
5. During investigation three accused persons, Chohan Doley, N N Choudhury and Priyangshu Bairagi were arrested and charge sheet was also laid against them, pending further investigation under Section 173 (A) of CrPC. Those three accused persons were subsequently released on bail. Present accused person, Gautam Baruwa, who is stated to have absconded at the initial stage, but, later on, he was also arrested on 24.02.2020 and, thereafter, were sent to judicial custody and charge sheet was also laid against him, after obtaining prosecution sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC. The learned trial Court in its status report has submitted that prosecution sanction as regards the other accused, Chohan Doley is not yet furnished under Section 19 of the PC Act and the proposal has been sent by the Secretary to the Government of India to the Prime Minister's office in this regard. Soon after obtaining the prosecution sanction order against Chohan Doley, the learned Court will consider the matter of taking cognizance of offences against the accused persons. 
Page No.# 3/6 
6. Thus, from the matters on record and the LCR, it reveals that the charge sheet has already been laid against all the accused persons at different stages and the case is pending for taking cognizance. 
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted before this Court that all remaining charge sheeted accused(s), except the present petitioner, have been granted bail by this Court as well as the trial Court and the bail prayer of the present accused petitioner should also be considered, in view of length of detention and as a matter of parity. Different bail order(s) of those accused persons have been pressed into as well as other bail order(s), passed by this Court in some other cases regarding the APSC case etc., where this Court granted the bail to co-accused(s) on the ground of parity and length of detention. 
8. Referred decisions annexed are gone through and also the LCR to assess the status of the case. 
9. In support of the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court have been submitted, wherein the Hon'ble Court has granted bail considering the length of detention in custody, without trial:- 
1) In (2000) 9 SCC 443; Vivek Kumar -Vs- State of UP, bail under Section 439 CrPC (in an offence under Sections 394/395 read with Section 149 IPC) was granted by holding that the accused person is in custody for a quiet long period without commencing the trial and there is no need to detain him in further custody. 
2) In (2002) 10 SCC 403; Sanjay @ Bablu -Vs- State of Gujarat, bail under Section 439 CrPC, (in an offence under Sections 120B/307/392/393 IPC) was granted, considering the length of detention under the custody, against the apprehension of prosecution that accused may abscond from the trial. 
3) In (2012) 4 SCC 134; Deepak S Mehta -Vs- CBI; bail has been granted under Section 439 CrPC, considering that where there is delay in trial, bail should not be denied. Paragraph-19 is quoted below:- 
"As observed earlier, we are conscious of the fact that the present appellant along with others are charged with economic offences of huge magnitude. At the same time, we cannot lose sight of the facts though the investigating agency has completed the investigation and submitted the charge sheet including the additional charge sheet, the fact remains that the necessary charges have not been framed. Therefore, the presence of the appellant in custody may not be necessary for further Page No.# 4/6 investigation. In view of the same, considering the health condition as supported by the documents, including the certificate of the medical officer, we are of the view that the appellant is entitled to an order of bail, pending trial on stringent conditions, in order to safeguard the interest of CBI." 
4) In 2012 (3) Supreme 270; Shiv Mohan Kapoor -Vs State of UP, bail has been granted under Section 439 CrPC, where the co-accused has already been granted bail. 
5) In 2018 (0) Supreme (SC) 1267; Omprakash @ Manta -Vs- State of MP, the Court granted bail after conviction on parity, where the sentence of other co-accused persons had been suspended. 
6) In (2018) 14 SCC 493; Sharad T Kabra -Vs- Union of India (in an offence under Section 120 (B)/420/467/468/471 IPC and Prevention of Money Laundering Act), bail was granted under Section 439 CrPC, holding that though the charge sheet has been submitted but the trial has not commenced and even the charges have not been framed against the accused and such release on bail should be on requisite conditions, as may be considered appropriate. 
10. This Court in (2018) 0 Supreme (Gau) 1044, Utpal Bhuyan -Vs- State of Assam, (in an offence under Sections 120 (B)/201/420/463/468/471 IPC, read with Section 13 (1) (a) (b), 13 (1) (d), 13 (2) of the PC Act) granted bail under Section 439 CrPC, in cases relating to APSC scam on the ground of parity, as the co-accused on the same footing has already been enlarged on bail by this Court. 
11. Placing reliance upon the above decisions and referring to the matters in hand, it has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the accused person is a 60-years-old man and is suffering from various ailments and undergoing treatment since 2016 onwards till date in various hospitals (vide Annexure- Q series) for the ailments, like inflammatory lump over right sole and calonic polyp syndrome and operated on 27.11.2017, at Indraprastha Apollo Hospital at New Delhi, further treatment at Fortis Memorial, Gurgaon, for pancreatis, multiple chronic polyps on 01.06.2016, at International Hospital, Guwahati, treated for acute pancreatic, Type-II Diabetes Mellitus, Systemic Hypertension, Grade-II BEP, Hyperuricaemia (as on 06.05.2016) and also other numerous documents annexed, that he was treated at other hospitals also for his various ailments. 
12. Further, bail has been sought for on the ground of parity as while remaining all other co- accused(s) have already been enlarged on bail and trial has not yet begun. The accused has already given an undertaking before this Court to cooperate with the trial and there is no apprehension of Page No.# 5/6 hampering the investigation and tampering the witnesses, as the investigation has already been completed and charge sheet has also been laid. 
13. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Mr N K Kalita, has, however, raised objection against the bail prayer pointing towards earlier conduct of accused as he absconded immediately after filing of the FIR and one cannot claim bail only on the ground of parity and otherwise, nature and gravity of the offence cannot be denied. It is submitted that the trial of the case will be started soon after the prosecution sanction, obtained against one of the accused, Chohan Doley. 
14. Due consideration has been given to the rival submissions of both the parties and also gone through the matters on record and the decisions referred above. The LCR as well as the status report is perused, which indicates that the charge sheet has already been submitted, but cognizance has not yet been taken for want of prosecution sanction in respect of one of the accused, which has to be granted by the Central Government, and the same is awaited. As many as four accused persons have been charge sheeted, including the present petitioner and all of the accused are similarly situated. Apart from accused No. 4, Priyanghu Bairagi, proprietor of M/s Purbashree Printing House, all other accused are the officials of ABOCWWB. The other accused person, Chohan Doley was granted bail after 6 months of his custody (with stringent conditions), considering his length of detention as well as the fact that investigation has already been completed and cognizance could not be taken for want of prosecution sanction and as the entire matter is based on documentary evidence, which has already been seized and release of accused will not hamper the case. The accused Priyangshu Bairagi was granted the default bail as the charge sheet was filed much after the statutory period. Accused N. N. Choudhury was granted bail by the learned trial Court on the similar observation that cognizance could not be taken for want of prosecution sanction, despite long detention of the accused. 
15. The present accused person is also similarly situated with other co-accused. Rather he is in long detention, in comparison to other accused persons. Although the present accused was arrested much later than the other accused, but it reveals that he will complete one year detention in the last part of this month and yet there is no immediate prospect of commencement of the trial, in view of the status report received from the trial Court. All other co-accused persons are on bail, particularly on the ground of length of detention, even after filing of the charge sheet, no cognizance, no charge. 
16. Even though the offence relates to economic offence, having magnitude, but a litigant has the right to speedy trial under the Constitution. The accused herein being aged 60+ years, with multiple ailments, should not be denied the privilege of bail, in the light of observation/decision rendered by the Page No.# 6/6 Hon'ble Apex Court, despite the magnitude of such economic offence, apart from the ground of parity. He should be allowed to face the trial regularly. On the other hand, the cognizance of offence has not yet been taken and the trial is far away. 
17. Considering all entirety, this Court is of the opinion that accused Gautam Baruwa should be enlarged on bail, with strict conditions. 
18 Resultantly the accused person named above is hereby allowed to go on bail of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousands) only with two solvent sureties of like amount, with the following directions: 
i) Not to leave the jurisdiction of the learned trial Court, without permission; 
ii) He will deposit his passport to the learned trial Court, at the time of furnishing the bail bond; 
iii) He will attend the trial regularly, without hampering the trial. 
19. With the above observations and directions, the bail petition stands disposed of. 

       

Section 436 Bail in Bailable offences

Section 436 – In what cases bail to be taken
(1) When any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail:
Provided that such officer or Court, if he or it thinks fit, may, [may, and shall, if such person is indigent and is unable to furnish surety, instead of taking bail] from such person, discharge him on his executing a bond without sureties for his appearance as hereinafter provided:
Provided further that nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 116 or section 446-A
[ Explanation .–Where a person is unable to give bail within a week of the date of his arrest, it shall be a sufficient ground for the officer or the Court to presume that he is an indigent person for the purposes of this proviso.]
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub- section (1), where a person has failed to comply with the conditions of the bail-bond as regards the time and place of attendance, the Court may refuse to release him on bail, when on a subsequent occasion in the same case he appears before the Court or is brought in custody and any such refusal shall be without prejudice to the powers of the Court to call upon any person bound by such bond to pay the penalty thereof under section 446.

Section 436 crpc provides for the bail in bailable offences, it casts a duty upon the police officer as well as the court to release the accused on bail in bailable offence when the accused is ready and prepared to furnish bail.

examples of Bailable offences Simple Hurt (Section 337; IPC), Bribery (Section 171E; IPC), Public Nuisance (Section 290; IPC), Death by Rash or Negligent Act (Section 304A; IPC) etc. in Indian penal code

This provision has been inserted with a view that a person who absconds or has broken the condition of his bail bond when he was released on bail in a bailable case on a previous occasion, shall not be entitled to bail when brought to Court on any subsequent date even though the offence may be bailable.

Scope of Default Bail under section 167 CrPC

Section 167 provides for the concept of default bail. it is a section which is based on the fundamental right to life and liberty as provided in the constitution of India.

It provides for the release of the accused from jail when the accused is ready and actually furnishes bail in the condition wherein the investigation agency does not file the chargesheet within 60 or 90 days after the arrest of the accused.

It must be noted that this section is applicable on at pre cognizance stage. This stage comes to an end as soon as the chargesheet is filed by the IO.

The grant of bail under section 167(2) Crpc is not on the merits of the cae but primarily a statutory and technical right of the accused which accrues in the vent of delay in completion of the investigation by the police.

The Hon’ble supreme court in Hussainara Khatoon Vs State of Bihar 1979 has held that it is the duty of the magistrate to inform the accused that he has a right to be released on bail under this section and if the accused is prepared to furnish bail and does furnish bail as ordered, he has to be released.

The kerala high court in State of kerala vs Sadanandan 1984 has held that the court is no clog on investigation and prosecution is no lever for humiliation. freedom of individual is not licence to commit crime; personal liberty can have no conflict with the public interest. It is the duty of the court to strike a balance.

Hence the court is duty bound to release the accused on bail when there is a default on the part of the IO in filling the chargesheet within the period of 60/90 days as the case may.

Arrest- Meaning?

The word arrest has neither been defined in the code of criminal procedure (Crpc) nor in the I or any other law which deals with criminal offences in India. Section 41 crPC onward provides for the powers of arrest as to who can arrest and whom can be arrested.

It only indicates as to what would constitute arrest is found in section 46 CrPC. In order to arrest a person, the police officer has to touch or confine the body of the person to be arrested unless there is submission to the custody by words or action.

The question as to whether the police is bound to arrest a person has been answered by the the punjab and haraya High court that a police officer is not always bound to arrest an accused even if the allegation against him is having committed cognizable offence.

In gist Arrest means a person in custody and the police is entitled to restrain him. But keep in mind that the custody and arrest are two different terms it means that in every arrest there is custody but not vice versa.

After arrest there are provisions of bail which we shall discuss in upcoming days.

what is the liability of Banks in Unauthorized and Fraudulent Online transactions

Online transactions are a new normal as the government is pushing for online transactions. Banks are also providing big discounts on online sale and purchase of products through credit and debit cards.
But sometimes people the infrastructure of the
On 21st December, 2020 in National consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC), the Hon’ble Presiding Member, Mr. C Viswanath dismissed the Revision Petition  filed under Section 21 (b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 in 1 HDFC Bank Ltd. & Anr. versus Jesna Jose R.P. N. 3333 of 2013 by HDFC Bank and held that the bank will be liable to pay to its customers in case of unauthorized transactions. Thus, the banks must compensate to its account holders in case of fraudulent transactions in the absence of any evidence to substantiate its stand that the fault was on the part of the account holder and in today’s digital age, the possibility that the credit card was hacked or forged cannot be ruled out.

Brief facts of the matter:

The vcitims purchased a pre-paid Forex Plus Debit from the bank in 2007 and the fraud took place in 2008. The victim’s father got a call from the Credit Card Division of bank for confirming the transaction attempted by the victim’s card. but after verifying the same from the victim, it came to the attention of both  that no such transaction was done by the victim/card holder and thereafter a complaint was registered in the police station, Los Angeles. The victim also received the chargeslips and came to know  that the signatures on the charge slip didn’t match the victim’s signatures

Victim filed a consumer complaint on the facts that the credit card was in her possession when the transaction took place and thus there is a possibility that her card could have been hacked or forged by some third party for which the petitioner is liable or some other technical and/or security lapse in the electronic banking system through which the transactions had taken place as the transaction took place several miles away from the actual place of the respondent.

The matter went on to the Hon’ble NCDRC wherein it was held that since the petitioner bank has failed to produce any evidence to substantiate that the fraudulent transaction took place because of the account holder’s fault hence, the petitioner will be liable for the same and the bank cannot rely on arbitrary terms and conditions to wriggle out of its liability towards customers and any such terms and conditions must be in conformity with the directions issued by the RBI which is responsible for safekeeping of the banking systems and maintaining checks and balances in the same.

The Hon’ble NCDRC also relied upon the  RBI circular dated 6th July, 2017 dealing with Customer Protection – Limiting Liability of Customers in Unauthorised Electronic Banking Transactions wherein it stated:-

“6. A customer’s entitlement to zero liability shall arise where the unauthorised transaction occurs in the following events:

Contributory fraud/ negligence/ deficiency on the part of the bank (irrespective of whether or not the transaction is reported by the customer).

Third party breach where the deficiency lies neither with the bank nor with the customer but lies elsewhere in the system, and the customer notifies the bank within three working days of receiving the communication from the bank regarding the unauthorized transaction.”

Time taken to report the fraudulent transaction from the date of receiving the communication

Customer’s liability

Within three working days –    Zero liability

Within four to seven working days –  The transaction value or the amount or the maximum liability of the customer ranges from ? 5,000 to ? 25,000, depending on the type of account whichever is lower

Beyond seven working days – As per bank’s Board approved policy

The Hon’ble NCDRC has observed as under:

“11. The first fundamental question that arises is whether the Bank is responsible for an unauthorized transfer occasioned by an act of malfeasance on the part of functionaries of the Bank or by an act of malfeasance by any other person (except the Complainant/account-holder). The answer, straightaway, is in the affirmative. If an account is maintained by the Bank, the Bank itself is responsible for its safety and security. Any systemic failure, whether by malfeasance on the part of its functionaries or by any other person (except the consumer/account-holder), is its responsibility, and not of the consumer.”

The Reserve bank of India (RBI) on 6th July 2017 amid the national drive toward digital transactions and rising incidents of fraud, had notified the norms in order to fix the liability in cases if a person loses money through an unauthorized electronic banking transaction like cyber attack on the bank or hacking of account.

The order passed by the Hon’ble NCDRC is going to help millions of people who fell victims to such frauds and unauthorised transactions because In today’s time with an increase in digital and net-banking transactions, the threat of fraud in online transactions and hacking are also on the rise.

In re-opening economy- What should business owners do to fight counterfeits/Fakes?

What Should Your Business should Do to fight counterfeit goods?

With the current reopening economy Countries are gradually opening the industries and borders.
The covid-19 has completely transformed our life, work style and shopping habits. Now more consumers are staying home so there has been a major shift to e-commerce. Although it is impossible to predict the long-term effect of covid-19 on retail industry. With the rise of e-commerce there are new threats as this time is being used as an opportunity by fraudsters.

The COVID-19 pandemic is wreaking havoc across all industries for essential/ non-essential products, thereby creating opportunities for counterfeiters who are taking advantage of the massive shift to panic buying among consumers worldwide.

Change in buying patterns
Right now the production is almost nill hence there are great chances that the market may be flooded with counterfeit goods and customers end up buying fake products. The current situation has caused, consumers to purchase goods both essential and non-essential in bulk without doing their due diligence. This change in purchase pattern will rise to counterfeiting due to high profits based on increased prices and bulk purchases by consumers of low quality goods.

It may be due to:
• counterfeiters directly manipulate the market through online stores, groups etc.
• companies aren’t able to complete due diligence process;


What should you do to fight counterfeit goods?
As per the current market trend the counterfeit products and services will continue to grow resulting into decreased market share for legitimate brand owners and hurting their brand image. The bugger problem is the harm to the consumer due to low quality/sub standard goods.

Every brand has to take measures to combat fakes and to protect its brand in the market.

The following strategies might help:.
Brand Protection and Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies:
Conduct an internal audit for a standard operating procedure for brand security- This assessment will help the companies to determine how their brands and products are protected in terms of legal security. Pay good attention to the distribution network.
Key intellectual property rights registry– Ensure that all intellectual property rights are registered and corrected in countries where the products are designed, produced, assembled and marketed. Until and unles the intellectual property is registered, companies cannot enforce removal of a fraudulent listing.


Routine monitoring of unauthorized use of your brands.
1. Online surveillance– Internet searches for proof of infringing activity are important. The de-listing or deleting infringing listings or domains in full and on a regular basis is necessary.
2. Physical surveillance– Companies should monitor major retailers and purchase store and legitimate sites to determine whether customer orders are being fulfilled with authentic products and also, monitoring products that are returned shall also help to identify the source in case of fakes.


Targeted enforcement.
1. Identify the market place where the fake goods are being sold.
2. Send cease and desist demands to infringers. If letters to cease and desist do not rectify the issue, and when particular counterfeiting activities are detected, different levels of enforcement should be considered.
3. Keep your consumers updated. Train & Educate your consumers so as to how to know if a product is fake or not.

Quick and effective communication can build brand loyalty.
To control the issue of counterfeiting amid COVID-19, companies need to have smarter enforcement, greater communication and exchange of knowledge. The ongoing battle against counterfeiters needs a 360 degree cooperation of manufacturers, IPR holders and brand owners, e-commerce sites, search engines and consumers.

Our legal system is already strong and diligent enough to enforce Intellectual property rights.

burden cannot be shifted upon the complainant to prove the debt or liability, without appreciating the presumption under Section 139

Hon’ble supreme court in APS FOREX SERVICES PVT LTD V/S SHAKTI INTERNATIONAL FASHION LINKERS & ORS has observed that burden cannot be shifted upon the complainant to prove the debt or liability, without appreciating the presumption under Section 139

The Hon’be apex court trhough a division bench of Hon’ble Judges: Ashok Bhushan and M R Shah passed the order.

Facts Note:
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, Sections 139 and 138-Appeal against acquittal-Accused took plea that cheque was given by way of security-Courts below shifted burden to prove debt upon complainant.

Held – Accused has admitted the issuance of the cheques and his signature on the cheque and that the cheque in question was issued for the second time, after the earlier cheques were dishonoured and that even according to the accused some amount was due and payable, there is a presumption under Section 139 that there exists a legally enforceable debt or liability-Story put forward by the accused that the cheques were given by way of security is not believable in absence of further evidence to rebut the presumption and more particularly the cheque in question was issued for the second time, after the earlier cheques were dishonoured-Both, Courts, have committed error in shifting the burden upon the complainant to prove the debt or liability, without appreciating the presumption under Section 139.

Similar words may be registered as Trademarks

The supreme court in NANDHINI DELUXE V/S KARNATAKA CO-OPERATIVE MILK PRODUCERS FEDERATION LTD has held that wherein the Respondent was dealing with business of milk product and the Respondent applied for trade mark Nandini and got same registered in its favour. The trademark was opposed on ground that it is deceptively similar to the mark of respondent. The apex court held that not only visual appearance of the two marks is different, they even relate to different products, manner in which they are traded by the appellant and respondent respectively, it is difficult to imagine that an average man of ordinary intelligence would associate the goods of the appellant as that of respondent.

Facts:
The dispute pertains to the use of mark ‘NANDHINI’. The respondent herein, which is a Cooperative Federation of the Milk Producers of Karnataka, adopted the aforesaid mark ‘NANDINI’ in the year 1985 and under this brand name it has been producing and selling milk and milk products. It has got registration of this mark as well under Class 29 and Class 30. The appellant herein, on the other hand, is in the business of running restaurants and it adopted the mark ‘NANDHINI’ for its restaurants in the year 1989 and applied for registration of the said mark in respect of various foodstuff items sold by it in its restaurants. The respondent had opposed the registration and the objections of the respondent were dismissed by the Deputy Registrar of the Trade Mark.

Observation:
The Hon’ble apex court has observed that the nature and style of the business of the appellant and the respondent are altogether different. Whereas respondent is a Cooperative Federation of Milk Producers of Karnataka and is producing and selling milk and milk products under the mark ‘NANDINI’, the business of the appellant is that of running restaurants and the registration of mark ‘NANDHINI’ as sought by the appellant is in respect of various foodstuffs sold by it in its restaurants.
Since not only visual appearance of the two marks is different, they even relate to different products. Further, the manner in which they are traded by the appellant and respondent respectively, highlighted above, hence it is difficult to imagine that an average man of ordinary intelligence would associate the goods of the appellant as that of the respondent.